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Demystifying the 
Prudential Carve-out:  
A proposal1
sAmuEl truJillo2
AbstrAct
this article explores how the broadest spirited exception in the framework of the 
World trade Organization, commonly referred to as the prudential carve-out, could 
be applied without adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations of Wto Mem-
bers. It argues that through the customary rules of interpretation of international law, 
the only standard applicable to the prudential carve out is that of a reasonable means 
to ends connection. However, this broad standard of review can be enriched by expert 
knowledge on financial and prudential regulation, given that the form of dispute settle-
ment established in the Annex to Financial services of the gats provides a window for 
dissecting the concept of “prudential”. the afs requires that an “expert panel” decide on 
controversies regarding financial and prudential issues, instead of the ordinary “highly 
qualified” Wto panel. the article draws on principles developed by the disciplines of 
1 Una versión anterior de este trabajo se presentó como requisito para obtener el título de Abogado. Esta 
versión está actualizada y adaptada al formato de la revista. since the writing of this article, the pru-
dential carve-out has been addressed by the Panel in Argentina - Measures relating to trade in Goods 
and services (september 30, 2015), see pp 7.811-7.949.
 Para citar el artículo: trujillo, s. (2015). Demystifying the Prudential carve-out: a proposal. Revista Con-
texto, (43), pp. 157-208. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.18601/01236458.n43.05
2 Abogado de la Universidad Externado de colombia, eximido de presentar exámenes preparatorios por 
el alto rendimiento académico. representó a su universidad en las competencias internacionales Phillip 
c. Jessup Moot court, European Law students Association Moot court y Foreign Direct Investment 
International Arbitration Moot. Asociado en brigard & Urrutia Abogados, donde apoya operaciones de 
financiación nacionales e internacionales como miembro del Equipo de Derecho bancario y servicios 
Financieros. correo electrónico: samuel.trujillo@est.uexternado.edu.co
 Attorney from Universidad Externado school of Law, exempted from presenting preparatory exams due 
to academic performance. He represented his University in the international competitions Phillip c. 
Jessup Moot court, European Law students Association Moot court, and Foreign Direct Investment 
International Arbitration Moot. Associate at brigard & Urrutia Abogados where ass part of the banking 
and Financial services team he assists in national and international finance operations. 
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micro- and macroprudential regulation to exemplify how expert knowledge can guide 
an otherwise vague standard of review.
Keywords: World trade Organization, General Agreement on trade in services, pru-
dential carve-out, expert panel, micro-prudential regulation, macro-prudential regulation.
DEsMItIFIcAnDO LA ExcEPcIón cAUtELAr: UnA PrOPUEstA
rEsUMEn
Este artículo explora cómo la excepción con el espíritu más amplio en el marco de la 
Organización Mundial de comercio, conocida como la excepción cautelar, puede ser 
aplicada sin disminuir, o agregarle a, los derechos y obligaciones de los miembros. 
Argumenta que, a través de las reglas consuetudinarias de interpretación del derecho 
internacional, el único estándar aplicable a la excepción cautelar es el de una conexión 
razonable entre medios y fines. sin embargo, este amplio criterio de revisión puede ser 
enriquecido por conocimiento experto en regulación financiera y prudencial, ya que 
el Anexo a servicios Financieros del agcs establece que debe ser un panel experto el 
que decida controversias sobre cuestiones financieras y prudenciales, en vez del panel 
“altamente cualificado” ordinario. El artículo hace referencia a principios desarrollados 
por las disciplinas de regulación micro y macroprudencial para ejemplificar cómo dicho 
conocimiento experto puede guiar un criterio de revisión, de otra forma vago.
Palabras clave: Organización Mundial del comercio, Acuerdo General sobre co-
mercio de servicios, excepción cautelar, panel experto, regulación micro-prudencial, 
regulación macroprudencial.
I. IntrODUctIOn: tHE PrUDEntIAL cArvE-OUt’s rELEvAncE  
AnD Its PrObLEMAtIc
the Annex on Financial services (afs) to the World trade Organization’s (Wto) General 
Agreement on trade in services (gats) establishes in an exception that allows Member 
states, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement to adopt measures for 
prudential reasons. An analysis of this provision, commonly referred to as the prudential 
carve-out, is relevant as it has yet to be invoked by any Wto Member, and consequently 
lacks a clear scope of application3. Furthermore, despite not having been invoked before 
3 mamiko yokio-arai, “gats’ Prudential carve Out in Financial services and Its relation with Prudential 
regulation” (2008) 57 Int’l & comp. L.Q. 613 at 639 [Yokio-Arai]; sydney j. key, “trade liberalization 
and prudential regulation: the international framework for financial services” (1999) 75 r.i.i.a. 61 at 67-
68 [Key] mary mcaLLister sHepro, “Preserving national regulatory Autonomy in Financial services: 
the gats’ Prudential carve-Out” (2013) notre Dame University (QL) [McAllister]; Panagiotis Delimatsis 
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an international tribunal, the prudential carve-out has proliferated in many other ins-
truments of international law4 as it can be found in many Free trade Agreements (ftas).
consequently this provision and the mist surrounding it, not only envelop the 
multilateral trading system as the prudential carve-out also constitutes applicable law 
in a significant quantity of bilateral and regional trade relations. As a result of the most 
recent global financial crisis and the subsequent concern regarding banking regulation, 
the legal vacuum regarding the exception’s correct interpretation and application is 
further highlighted.
the problem centers on determining what can be considered “prudential”, and the 
limits to the use of the prudential carve-out. Following dsu Article 3.2, this analysis 
cannot add to, or diminish the rights and obligations of Wto Members, as these may 
only be clarified through the application of customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. such interpretative processes is difficult since most Wto Members 
did not, and still do not, wish to clearly determine the meaning of “prudential”, both in 
the Wto framework and in their regional and bilateral trade relations. Instead, they find 
comfort in the mist that surrounds the provision.
As the comfort that most Wto Members currently enjoy in the prudential carve-
out’s ambiguity could one day be challenged, a Wto Panel would have the need, and 
obligation, to clarify the provision’s content. the purpose of this work is to show how 
this could be achieved, removing the mist that surrounds the provision in a manner 
consistent with Wto interpretation that respects and follows the will of its Members.
the starting point in the analysis, is to understand the Wto concept of a “measure”, 
which unlike the concept of prudential, has been addressed by the Appellate body (section 
ii). such understanding will demonstrate the existence of a vast panorama of situations 
in which the prudential carve-out could be found to be applicable. subsequently, the 
analysis will compare the original afs prudential carve-out with those introduced into 
the fta’s of some of the most representative Wto Members (section iii). such comparison 
will provide perspective as to the evolution of the provision, showing that there are two 
main approaches preferred by certain Wto Members. One of these approaches strives 
to severely limit the provision.
Afterwards, section iv will show to what extent the prudential carve-out’s ambiguity 
can be limited through a strict analysis that follows the customary rules for the interpre-
tation of treaties. First through an interpretation the follows the general rule, and then 
recurring to the supplementary means, seeking to confirm and further clarify the will of 
the Wto Members. this section will show that although prudential measures must ha-
ve a reasonable means to ends connection with the legitimate objectives they peruse, a 
narrower standard cannot be applied. As section iv will demonstrate certain conformity 
& Pierre suavé, “Financial services trade after the crisis: Policy and legal conjectures” (2010) 13(3) J. 
Int’l Econ. L. 837 at 849 [Delimatsis & Suavé].
4 Key (p. 67).
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by Wto Members regarding the provision’s ambiguity, section v will analyze whether 
such state of mind still exists today.
section v will demonstrate that Wto Members are still reluctant in determining a 
more tangible meaning regarding the provision. consequently, the work presented will 
contend that this traditional interpretation, which would be undertaken by an ordinary 
Wto Panel, would fall short. It does provide some clarity as to the provision’s scope of 
application, but fails to fully demystify the provision. However, section vi seeks to aide 
this situation, and argues that despite failing to provide a tangible content to the concept 
of “prudential”, the traditional interpretation, expected of any ordinary Wto Panel, does 
provide the key for demystifying the provision.
this crucial element is the form of dispute settlement specifically established by Wto 
Members in the afs, which provides a window for consolidating the term “prudential”. 
by requiring an expert Panel, as opposed to an ordinary Panel, dispute settlement in 
the afs calls for the application of expert knowledge on prudential and financial issues. 
In essence, the “reasonable means to ends connection” that prudential measures must 
have, can be evaluated through more specified and specialized elements that the expert 
knowledge on prudential and financial matters provides.
section vii provides an example of the expert knowledge that a Panel could apply 
when determining whether a measure truly is prudential, making use of two disciplines 
developed in international finance law and regulation. these are macro- and micropru-
dential policy, which have a concrete link with the legitimate objectives that the carve-out 
intends to protect. Lastly, section viii synthetizes the previously reached conclusions, 
and contends that through the proposed analysis a Wto Panel can adequately clarify 
and apply the prudential carve-out on a case by case basis, in a manner that is consistent 
with proper Wto interpretation.
II. tHE cOncEPt OF “MEAsUrE” UnDEr tHE GAts
before facing the challenge of determining what a measure taken for a prudential reason 
consists of, we can identify the general concept of “measures” within the Wto. this ser-
ves to illustrate what exactly could be challenged, and would therefore be susceptible 
to finding refuge in the prudential carve-out. Unlike the concept of “prudential”, the 
notion of “measures” has found development in the Wto, ergo before interpreting the 
term “prudential”, we can form an idea as to what these measures can involve.
gats Article 1 when establishing the scope of the Agreement addresses “measures by 
Members affecting trade in services”5. Additionally, gats Article xxviii(a) loosely defines 
the term as “any measure by a Member, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, pro-
cedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form”6. this is a broad definition as 
5 General Agreement on trade in services (gats), 1869 u.n.t.s. 183, Article i.1 [gaTs].
6 gaTs Article xxviii(a).
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recognized by the Panel in China-Eps7 since even the administrative application of general 
instruments like laws, constitutes a measure under the gats8. Moreover, for purposes of 
dispute settlement, a measure can be “[i]n principle, any act or omission attributable to 
a Wto Member”9. usually one of its organs10, including the executive branch11.
this is of particular importance when dealing with prudential regulation since the 
legal framework can grant administrative authorities a degree of discretion when applying 
prudential measures, and consequently noncompliance with gats commitments could 
result from the regulation’s application12.
the scope of the gats requires that the measure must affect trade in services, a con-
cept that has also been developed by the Appellate body. Like the term “measure”, the 
term “affect” has received a broad interpretation: “[t]he ordinary meaning of the word 
‘affecting’ implies a measure that has ‘an effect on’, which indicates a broad scope of 
application”13. Despite its broad scope, it is not an analysis that can be overlooked, and 
requires determining whether the trade in services effectively exists as one of the four 
forms of supply, and whether the measure at hand has an effect on the supply of the 
services, or on the service suppliers14.
Given the broad concept of measures that affects trade in services, gats provisions 
are applicable to a great variety of acts or omissions attributable to a state, depending 
on the level of commitments undertaken.15 In the context of financial services, the pru-
dential carve-out could allow the inconsistency with any gats commitment by such a 
wide array of measures, provided they are taken from prudential reasons.
7 China-Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services (Complaint by United States) (2009) Wto Doc Wt/
ds413/r (Panel report) para.7.219.
8 European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (Complaint by United States) (1998) 
Wto Doc Wt/ds62/ab/r (Appellate body report) para 65, [Ec – Computer Equipment]; migueL castro-
riberos, “colombia’s Policy space for Prudential regulation: an Analysis from its International trade 
commitments” (2013) 23 rev col der intern. 119 at 124 [Castro-Riberos].
9 United States — Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan 
(Complaint by Japan) (2003) Wto Doc Wt/ds244/ab/r (Appellate body report) para 81, [us — Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review]; European Communities — Selected Customs Matters (Complaint by United States) (2006) 
Wto Doc wT/ds315/ab/R (Appellate Body Report) para.133.
10 gaTs Article i.3 “measures by Members means measures taken by (i) central, regional or local govern-
ments and authorities; and (ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, 
regional or local governments or authorities”.
11 us – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review para.81.
12 Castro-Riberos p. 124.
13 European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Complaint by Ecuador, Honduras, 
Guatemala, Mexico, United States) (1997) Wto Doc Wt/ds27/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.220.
14 Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Complaint by Japan) (2000) Wto Doc Wt/ds139/
ab/r (Appellate body report) paras 151–152, 155, 159, 164-166; diana zacHarias, “Article i gats: 
scope and Definition” in ruideger WoLfrum, peter-tobais stoLL, & cLemens feinaugLe, eds., Max 
Planck commentaries on World trade Law: Wto trade in services (Leiden- boston: Martinus nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008) 31 at 47 [Zacharias].
15 McAllister p. 25.
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gats commitments that are most likely to be inconsistent with prudential regulation 
in the banking sector are Most Favored nation (gats Article ii) and national treatment 
(gats Article xvii). For example, all foreign banks or those established in a certain coun-
try could be subjected to less favorable treatment than that given to domestic banks, 
through the imposition of stringent conditions after assessing the inadequate or insuffi-
cient supervision of their host state, such as greater minimum capital requirements16.
the Wto’s broad interpretation of the concepts “measure” and “affect” contribute to 
further enhance the prudential carve-out as a powerful provision. It can be used against 
any commitment in financial services, and cover a plethora of actions or omissions at-
tributable to a state. this leads us to wonder the extent of its potency, the source of 
which is the term “prudential”. Another factor that wakens our interest is the popularity 
this provision has achieved. Although Wto Members have yet to invoke it, they have 
not held back in rewriting it into their ftas.
III. tWO MAIn APPrOAcHEs WHEn EstAbLIsHInG tHE PrUDEntIAL cArvE-OUt 
ExcEPtIOn In IntErnAtIOnAL LEGAL InstrUMEnts
Although the birthplace of the prudential carve-out is the gats afs it has reproduced 
itself outside of the Wto legal framework. In this process of replication the prudential 
carve-out has undergone mutations. some of these mutations have brought it a more 
polished feel without significantly modifying it, while other mutations have given birth to 
prudential carve-out anomalies, or more specifically prudential carve-out ghosts. through 
the first approach, taken by the United states, canada, and Japan, the prudential carve 
out maintains its nature as a broad and strong exception17. Of course there are many 
other nations that have kept the phrasing and spirit of the gats afs carve out in their 
ftas, but we focus on these three as the most potent representatives of the first approach.
the second is the European approach which strives for a weakened exception, 
moving away from the spirit of the gats prudential carve-out. As the heavyweights 
of international trade, these nations are able to impose their approach on their treaty 
counterparts in varying degrees. However, when the European approach collides with 
the strong exception champions, the latter ones prevail.
the analysis that leads to this observation is based on some of the latest and most 
key ftas signed by the United states, Japan, canada, the European Union, and efta
We must first look at the original prudential carve-out. It is this prudential carve-
out that we will interpret through the customary rules of interpretation of international 
law, as this can also aide the understanding of the carve-outs incorporated in other legal 
instruments.
16 castro-riberos pp.128-136.; McAllister p. 8. 
17 armin von bogdandy, armin & josepH Windsor, “Annex on Financial services” in ruideger WoLfrum, 
peter-tobais stoLL, & cLemens feinaugLe, eds., Max Planck commentaries on World trade Law: Wto 
trade in services (Leiden- boston: Martinus nijhoff Publishers, 2008) 618 at 634 [Bongdandy & Windsor].
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2 (a) notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member shall not be pre-
vented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, 
depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service 
supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such measures 
do not conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of 
avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement18.
a. The strong exception approach
the only significant change found in the ftas signed by the United states and canada is 
a footnote after the term prudential reasons stating that these include “the maintenance 
of the safety, soundness, integrity, or financial responsibility of individual financial ins-
titutions or cross-border financial service suppliers”19. this shared wording originates 
in the nafta, where these objectives are squeezed in between protection of investors, 
depositors, etc., and ensuring the integrity and stability of the financial system20.
regarding the original prudential carve-out in the gats afs, this footnote introdu-
ces further legitimate objectives that prudential measures may peruse concerning the 
stability and financial responsibility of individual financial institutions. However, the 
list of legitimate objectives in the gats afs carve-out is merely exemplary as it will be 
demonstrated in section iv. therefore the absence of a reference to institution specific 
objectives does not close the door to measures that pursue such objectives.
Japan has preferred to leave the prudential carve-out untouched, and even in its 
latest Economic Partnership Agreements (2014-2015), and the provision is an almost 
identical representation of the original gats carve-out21. consequently, the prudential 
carve-out as used by the United states, canada and Japan, maintains the same spirit 
of being a strong and broad exception. It has been modernized to some extent by the 
United states and canada through the introduction of exemplary legitimate objectives 
that center on the stability and responsibility of individual institutions. Yet as stated 
18 gaTs afs Paragraph 2(a). 
19 For example: trade Promotion Agreement between the United states of America and the republic of 
Panama, 28 June 2007, (entered into force 31 October 2012) Article 12(10); trade Promotion Agreement 
between the United states of America and the republic of colombia, 22 november 2006, (entered into 
force 15 May 2012) Article 12(10); Free trade Agreement between the United states of America and the 
republic of Korea, 30 June 2007 (entered into force 15 March 2012) Article 12(10); trade Promotion 
Agreement between canada and colombia, 21 november 2008 (entered into force 15 August 2011) 
Article 11(10); Free trade Agreement between canada and the republic of Korea, 22 september 2015 
(entered into force 1 January 2015) Article 10(10).
20 north American Free trade Agreement, 17 December 1992 (entered into force 1 January 1994) Article 
1410; also integrated into the exception without a footnote in the Free trade Agreement between canada 
and the republic of Honduras, 5 november 2013 (entered into force 1 October 2014) Article 13(10).
21 Agreement between Japan and the republic of Peru for an Economic Partnership, 31 May 2011 (entered 
into force 1 March 2012) Annex 7 Article 8; Agreement between Japan and Australia for an Economic 
Partnership, 8 July 2014 (entered into force 15 January 2015) Article 11.4; Agreement between Japan 
and Mongolia for an Economic Partnership, 10 February 2015 (not yet in force) Annex 4 Article 3.
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above, the absence of this mention would not mean that the gats afs prudential carve-
out would not cover such prudential reasons.
b. The weak exception approach
Discontent with the original strong and broad prudential carve-out has stemmed from 
Europe, and here we group the ftas signed by the European Union and efta since we 
can identify a shared and almost identical approach. the origin of this discontent is 
most likely owed to switzerland. As the first mayor dissenter of the gats afs carve-out, 
switzerland was never quite comfortable with the broad and strong spirit that pleased 
most other Wto members, as will be evidenced in section iv(c). this seed of unconfor-
mity has spread to the rest of Europe.
the wording of the prudential carve-out in the European approach hopes to contain 
three interesting differences. these three elements escalade in transforming and limiting 
the strong and broad spirit of the original prudential carve out, and the presence of all 
three results in what was previously referred to as a prudential carve-out ghost. natura-
lly, European negotiators have not been successful in introducing all three elements in 
all of their ftas. We will first present the three elements of the European approach and 
then refer to the ftas which have managed to include them.
In the first place, in efta ftas the measures taken for prudential reasons are expressly 
required to be “reasonable”, a word absent in the afs. this first distinctive element surely 
intends to limit the scope of the carve-out by expressly conditioning the prudential rea-
sons to a standard of reasonability, which is in principle undefined. In spite of this, we will 
show how reasonability is carved into the afs prudential carve-out’s essence, so ultima-
tely this first distinctive element does not significantly hinder the prudential carve-out.
the second element, present some European ftas is by far the most innovative. 
Instead of the afs prudential carve-out’s final sentence stating that the carve-out must 
not be used to circumvent obligations under the agreement, the limitation is much mo-
re solid. A measure would not be prudential if it’s more burdensome than necessary to 
achieve its purpose. Although not a stranger to the Wto, this “not more burdensome than 
necessary” requirement is not present in the wording of the afs prudential carve-out. In 
section iv(c) it will be demonstrated how the application of such a standard to the afs 
prudential carve-out would be quickly discarded by many Wto Members.
this requirement is interesting because it employs a familiar Wto standard, undou-
btedly giving more weight to the goal of liberalization but still allowing for regulatory 
space. some may see the introduction of this standard as a middle-ground, and compa-
red to the final element it very well could be. Although the not more burdensome than 
necessary standard significantly handicaps the original spirit of the prudential carve-out, 
the third element of the European approach implies total paralysis.
In a few ftas the ue and efta have managed to introduce this third element. It man-
dates that prudential measures must not discriminate against financial services or financial 
service suppliers of another Party in comparison to the Party’s own like financial servi-
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ces or like financial service suppliers (national treatment). In short, national treatment 
obligations are not carved out in these ftas22. this last element is what turns these 
prudential carve-outs into carcasses as they cannot be used to discriminate, when the 
main obligation is precisely non-discrimination. In fact, when analyzing the negotiating 
history of the gats afs prudential carve-out we will see that national treatment was the 
main commitment many Members had in mind when drafting the prudential carve-out.
As mentioned above, the entirety of the European approach has not prevailed in every 
fta. the epa between Japan and switzerland stays entirely true to the gats afs carve-out, 
ignoring the word “reasonable”, along with the swiss Model’s entire second paragraph. 
Instead it employs the traditional warning against abusing the prudential carve-out23.
In efta’s fta with singapore24, the second paragraph’s prohibition of discrimination 
is limited to a discrimination of an unjustifiable or arbitrary nature. In the efta fta with 
the republic of Korea25, the carve out follows the gats’ afs provision, but includes a final 
phrase establishing the requirement that such measures shall not be more burdensome 
than necessary. the wording of the carve-out in the efta-singapore and efta-Korea 
ftas is much more reasonable, manifesting a clear will towards a more restricted and 
narrow approach, without negating the possibility to discriminate altogether. Weaker 
negotiators have succumbed to accepting the three elements, which can be found in the 
efta-colombia, efta-Mexico and efta-central American ftas26.
the same pattern can be observed in the European Union’s ftas. For example, the 
prudential carve-out in the European Union – singapore fta includes the word “reaso-
nable”, and the second paragraph establishes the “not more burdensome than necessary” 
requirement. However, the prohibition of discrimination is conditioned to that of an 
unjustifiable or arbitrary nature27. In the European Union – Korea fta, only the “not 
more burdensome than necessary” element has been introduced28. Again, weaker nego-
22 castro-riberos pp. 143-147. 
23 Agreement on Free trade and Economic Partnership between Japan and the swiss confederation, 19 
Februrary 2009 (entered into force 1 september 2009) Annex vi Article vi(1).
24 Free trade Agreement between the efta states and singapore, 26 June 2002 (entered into force 1 January 
2003) Annex viii Article 3 (1)(2). 
25 Free trade Agreement between the efta states and the republic of Korea, 15 December 2005 (entered 
into force 1 september 2006 for norway, Liechtenstein and switzerland; 1 October 2006 for Iceland) 
Article 4.8(2).
26 Free trade Agreement between the republic of colombia and the efta states, 25 november 2008 (ente-
red into force 1 July 2011 for colombia, Lichtenstein, and switzerland; 1 september 2014 for norway; 
1 October 2014 for Iceland) Annex xvi Article 6.1; Free trade Agreement between the efta states and 
Mexico, 27 november 2000 (entered into force 1 July 2001) Article 36; Free trade Agreement between 
the efta states and the central American states, June 24 2013 (entered into force 19 August 2014 for 
costa rica, Panama and norway; 29 August 2014 for Liechtenstein and switzerland; 5 september 2014 
for Iceland) Annex xvii, Article 5(1)(2). 
27 Free trade Agreement between the European Union and singapore, negotiations concluded 17 De-
cember 2012 (not yet in force) Article 8.50. 
28 Free trade Agreement between the European Union and the republic of Korea, 15 October 2009 (en-
tered into force 1 July 2011) Article 7.38.
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tiators have accepted prudential carve-out provisions containing all three elements, as 
can be seen in the European Union – Mexico fta and the European Union – colombia 
and Peru fta29.
c. When the approaches meet
the European or weak exception approach has led to head-butting with the heavy-weight 
sympathizers of the classically broad prudential carve out. negotiations with canada for 
the canada-European Union: comprehensive Economic and trade Agreement (ceta) 
were held up due to these diverging positions regarding the prudential carve-out30. the 
prudential carve-out that has resulted from this clash of titans is one of a kind, and could 
be the first to see action in the front of dispute settlement. the following observations 
are based on leaked ceta texts31.
At a first glance the prudential carve-out in this fta, found in Article 15.1 of the 
chapter on Financial services, seems ordinary except for the inclusion of the term “rea-
sonable” to describe the measures. Article 15.3 allows the prohibition of a particular 
financial service or activity as long as it is transversal, respecting national treatment and 
Most Favored nation provisions, i.e. with no discrimination. However this prohibition 
cannot apply to all financial services or a complete sub-sector. What really makes this 
prudential carve-out stand out is its connection with Investor-state dispute settlement.
Article 20.1(b) of this chapter, establishes that the provisions on Investor-state 
dispute settlement are also applicable to disputes in which the prudential carve-out is 
invoked. the respondent state has a few options when invoking the carve-out. It can 
refer the matter to the Financial services committee (fsc) for it to determine whether 
the prudential carve-out is a valid defense to the claim. If there is a joint determination 
by the fsc (or the ceta trade committee) that the prudential carve-out is a valid de-
fense, the arbitral proceedings will be discontinued. the fsc could also find that the 
carve-out does not apply to the entirety of the claims, and proceedings may continue in 
that respect. the time limit for such determination is three months, after which arbitral 
proceedings will continue. the respondent state can also request the tribunal to decide 
on the application of the prudential carve-out as a preliminary matter.
this version of the prudential carve-out is much more likely to find its way into 
dispute settlement. Unlike the other variations of the prudential carve-out, the challen-
29 trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member states, of the one part, and colombia 
and Peru, of the other part, 26 June 2012 (entered into force 1 August 2013) Article 154; Economic 
Partnership, Political coordination and cooperation Agreement between the European community 
and its Member states, of the one part, and the United Mexican states, of the other part, 8 December 
1997 (entered into force 1 October 2000), Decision 2/2001 of the Eu-Mexico Joint Council Article 19.
30 Heather soffield, “eu, canada’s differences over financial services holding up free trade pact: documents” 
The Canadian Press (29 May 2013) (QL). 
31 European commission Directorate-General for trade (trade Policy committee) “ceta consolidated 
text” 5 August 2014, brussels (QL).
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ging of measures taken for prudential reasons is not left to the political disposition of 
the contracting states and is open to investors.
Another clash of titans that could mold a new mutation of the prudential carve-out 
could come through the transatlantic trade and Investment Partnership (ttip) between 
the European Union and the United states. there has been pressure by the European 
banking Federation for the European Union to limit a classically broad prudential carve 
out32. the European Union’s leaked draft proposal on trade in services, Investment and 
Electronic commerce of July 2 201333 includes a “not more burdensome than necessary” 
requirement.
We can see through these examples, how switzerland and the European Union aim 
at a restricted, caged and almost self-negating prudential carve-out, and are able to im-
pose such wording on weaker or less convicted negotiators, while yielding to stronger 
negotiators on different levels. It also shows us how despite never having been invoked, 
the prudential carve-out can evolve.
d. A foggy glimpse into the future with tisa
the trade in services Agreement is an ambitious project launched in mid-2012 by a 
coalition of Wto members referred to as the “really Good Friends” of services group 
(rgf). As a result of the deadlock in Doha round negotiations, after the 8th Ministe-
rial conference in December 2011 the United states and Australia lead a proposal that 
sought to advance plurilateral negotiations on services liberalization34. On July 5th 2012, 
the rgf group agreed to prepare negotiations on an international services agreement35. 
these negotiations launched in early 2013 and eight rounds have been held so far with 
the participation of 23 countries: Australia, canada, chile, chinese taipei, colombia, 
costa rica, European Union (representing its 28 Member states), Hong Kong, Iceland, 
Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, new Zealand, norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, republic of Korea, switzerland, turkey and the United states, with the latest round 
32 European banking Federation “ebf position on the inclusion of financial services in the transatlantic 
trade and Investment Partnership negotiations” 7 June 2013, brussels (ebf_002430) (QL).
33 European commission Directorate-General for trade (trade Policy committee: services and Inves-
tment) “ttip negotiations: Modified eu draft proposals on trade in services, investment and electronic 
commerce” 2 July 2013, brussels. Article 32 (QL). 
34 pierre suavé, “A Plurilateral Agenda for services? Assessing the case for a trade in services Agreement 
(tisa)” (2013) ncrr trade regulation (QL); see also pierre suavé, “the Plurilateral Agreement on ser-
vices” (2013) European Parliament-Directorate General for External Policies p. 6. (QL); gary cLyde 
Hufbauer, bradford jensen & sHerry stepHenson, “Framework for the International services Agree-
ment” (2012) Peterson Institute for International Economics (QL); ictsd, “services Openings Eyed by 
some Wto Members” 16(9) bridges Weekly trade news Digest (7 March 2012) pp. 5-6. (QL).
35 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and trade, Press release “Advancing negotia-
tions on services” (5 July 2012) (QL); Office of the United states trade representative, Press release 
“Advancing negotiations on trade in services” (5 July 2012) (QL). 
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planned for December 2014[36]. Do these revolutionary negotiations hold revolutionary 
changes to the prudential carve out?
the most likely outcome is that they won’t. the following is the drafted text of 
tisa’s Financial services Annex between the 5th and 6th rounds of negotiations, with the 
consolidation of texts as of April 14 2014. this is a classified document, meant to be 
disclosed only 5 years after the agreement’s entry into force, or after the close of nego-
tiations; however it has been leaked by Wikileaks.
1. notwithstanding any other provision of the Agreement, a Party shall not be prevented 
from [pa, eu: taking] [us: adopting or maintaining] measures for prudential reasons, including 
for: (a) the protection of investors, depositors, [pa, us financial market users], policy-holders 
or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier; or (b) to ensure 
the integrity and stability of a Party’s financial system.
2. Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of this Agreement, they shall not 
be used as a means of avoiding the Party’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement37.
As can be clearly evidenced, there is nothing revolutionary about this prudential 
carve-out, in fact it is almost identical, word for word, with the gats’afs prudential carve 
out. together with the analysis in section v regarding the Member states’ will in deter-
mining the prudential cave-out’s content in the committee on Financial services, this is 
evidence of the somewhat general state of conformity with the provision’s current wor-
ding. We must take into account that although not a Wto Agreement, the tisa promoters 
aim to offer participation to other Wto Members and maintaining consistency with the 
familiar and original wording of the gats is convenient for that purpose. Yet beyond this 
consideration, it seems that the European desire for a restrictive prudential carve-out 
has no hope of materializing in a plurilateral agreement like tisa, which involves several 
powerful sympathizers of the broad approach like canada, the United states, and Japan.
e. A traditional pattern in the listed legitimate objectives common to both approaches
A common feature in both the strong and weak exception approaches is that the legiti-
mate objectives are still listed in an illustrative, non-exhaustive, manner as set forth by 
the expressions “including”, and “such as”. consequently, the fact that the protection 
of a particular type of entity is not listed as a legitimate objective, does not mean that a 
measure taken for its protection would fall outside the scope of the carve-out. However, 
if we compare the legitimate objectives that are indeed illustrated, we can observe that 
36 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and trade, Trade in Services Agreement, (QL).
37 trade in services Agreement country negotiators, “trade in services Agreement (tisa) Annex [x]: Fi-
nancial services, consolidation of text proposals” (14 April 2014) (released by Wikileaks on June 19 
2014) Article x.17: Prudential Measures.
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the express mention of non-institutional actors refers to financial consumers that are in 
some way creditors, as opposed to debtors, of the financial system (investors, depositors, 
holders or beneficiaries of an insurance policy, etc.).
In Latin America there seems to be a trend to move away from that general pattern, 
which is naturally not imposed on mightier trading partners from the northern hemis-
phere, but can be found in the ftas signed between these nations. colombia, Mexico and 
costa rica tend to include the protection of takers of funds as a legitimate objective38. 
the prudential carve-out in the colombia-costa rica fta reaches the broadest point 
including the protection of all financial market participants as a legitimate objective.
the non-inclusion of these actors does not necessarily mean that the protection of 
other financial services consumers would not be a legitimate objective, especially since 
such protection is present in domestic law. For example for financial consumers that are 
debtors to the financial system the right to receive objective information on the access 
to financial services and products tends to be present in domestic regulation39. there 
can even be less traditional objectives. One of the most peculiar is found in the United 
states where the community Affairs unit of the bureau of Financial consumer Protection, 
established in section 1011 of the Dodd-Frank, is tasked with “providing information, 
guidance, and technical assistance regarding the offering and provision of consumer fi-
nancial products or services to traditionally underserved consumers and communities”40 
In general, the protection of financial services consumers not traditionally listed in pru-
dential carve-out still constitutes a preoccupation for countries41.
However, the trend in the legitimate objectives that are listed in the prudential carve-
out provisions does prove that more attention is given to the protection of consumers 
that have trusted funds to the financial system. consequently, in section vii when exem-
plifying how a Wto Panel could demystify the prudential carve-out we will work with 
the legitimate objective of depositor protection which is found in all of the prudential 
carve-out provisions we have cited. this is without prejudice that the same can be done 
for all of the legitimate objectives listed in these provisions.
38 tratado de Libre comercio entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y la república de colombia, 13 June 
1994 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Article 12 (09); Acuerdo de Libre comercio entre la república 
de colombia y la república de costa rica, 22 May 2013 (not yet in force) Article 14.10.
39 For example throughout the Pacific Alliance, chile: Ley 19.496 (1997) Article 3, modified by Ley 20.555 
(2011) Article 1.; colombia Ley 1328 (2009) Articles 5,6.; Mexico Ley Federal de Protección al Consumidor 
(1992) Articles 7,7bis.; Ley de Protección y Defensa al Usuario de Servicios Financieros Articles 52,53; Peru Ley 
29.571 Código de Protección y Defensa al Consumidor (2010) Article 1.1(b).
40 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. n.º 111-203, (2010) §1013 b.(2); Authors 
like Allen & Herring consider that broader social objectives, like the facilitation of home ownership, 
provide justification for many other regulations aside from the traditional justifications such as the avoi-
dance of financial crises, see: Franklin Allen & richard Herring, “banking regulation versus securities 
Market regulation” (2001) Wharton school University of Pennsylvania, p. 1.
41 For example, there is a G20-oecd task force for the implementation of the G20 High Level Principles on 
Financial Consumer Protection, (October 2011) containing principles like Disclosure and transparency, and 
Financial Education and Awareness. 
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Iv. IntErPrEtInG tHE PrUDEntIAL cArvE-OUt In AccOrDAncE WItH 
IntErnAtIOnAL LAW’s cUstOMArY rULEs OF IntErPrEtAtIOn
Despite how obscure or ambiguous a treaty’s provision may be, there is consensus on 
the method that should be employed when interpreting it. the International Law com-
mission (iLc) sought to identify the general principles of law that governed treaties, in-
cluding the rules of treaty interpretation that had taken form as customary international 
law42. by 1966 it had compiled these rules, identified in pca, icj and pcij decisions43, 
in its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, in Article 27, general rule of interpretation, and 
Article 28, supplementary means of interpretation44. based on this work, the General 
Assembly through resolution 2166 (xxi) of December 196645, convened an international 
conference of plenipotentiaries to consolidate the work into a treaty. On May 22 1969, 
the conference adopted the vienna convention on the Law of treaties (vcLt), whose 
articles 31 and 32 enshrine the general and supplementary rules of treaty interpretation.
the icj has recognized the rules enshrined in vcLt Articles 31 and 32 as constitu-
ting customary international law46 and in the context of the Wto the Appellate body 
has done the same47. this is particularly important given that Article 3.2 of the Dispute 
settlement Understanding (dsu) states that the Wto’s dispute settlement mechanism 
42 ian broWnLie, Principles of Public International Law (new York: Oxford University Press, 2008) p. 632. 
[Brownlie].
43 For example: case concerning rights of nationals of the United states of America in Morocco (France 
v United states) Judgment of August 27 1952, [1952] icj rep 176, pp. 196,199 [us Nationals in Morocco]; 
competence of the iLo in regard to International regulation of the conditions of the Labour of Persons 
Employed in Agriculture “Advisory Opinion” (12 August 1922) pcij series b n.º 2, 9, p. 23; Ambatielos 
case (Greece v United Kingdom) Preliminary Objection, [1952] icj rep 28, p. 44; russian claim for 
Interest on Indemnities (russia v turkey) “Award of the tribunal” (11 november 1912) (Unofficial 
English translation) the Hague, p. 3; corfu channel case (United Kingdom v Albania) Judgment of 
9 April 1949 [1949] icj rep 2, p. 25; Legal status for Eastern Greenland “Judgment” (5 April 1933) pcij 
series A/b n.º 53, 22, p. 49.; Polish Postal service in Dazing “Advisory Opinion” (16 May 1925) pcij 
series b n.º 11, 4, p. 39.
44 International Law commission, “Draft Articles on the Law of treaties with commentaries” (1966) ii 
Yearbook of the International Law commission.
45 International conference of plenipotentiaries on the law of treaties, ga res 2166 (xxi), ungaor, 1484th plenary mee-
ting (1966). 
46 For example territorial Dispute case (Libyan Arab Jamahiririya v chad) Judgment of 3 February 1994 
[1994] icj rep 4, para.41; Oil Platforms case (Islamic republic of Iran v United states) Judgment of 
6 november 2003 [2003] icj rep 161, para.41; case concerning Kasikili/sedudu Island (botswana v 
namibia) Judgment of 13 December 1999 [1999] icj rep 1045, para.18; maLcom d. evans, International 
Law (new York: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 184. [Evans].
47 United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Complaint by Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) 
(1996) Wto Doc Wt/ds2/ab/r (Appellate body report) para 17, [us- Gasoline]; Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages para 10; United States — Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974 (Complaint by European Communities) 
(1999) Wto Doc Wt/ds152/r (Panel report) para.7.21.; United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (Complaint by Japan) (2001) Wto Doc Wt/ds184/ab/r (Appellate body 
report) para.60 [us – Hot Rolled Steel]. 
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must clarify the provisions contained in the covered agreements in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law48.
Although applying these rules to the prudential carve-out provision will not ma-
gically consolidate its elusiveness with a tangible content, it will provide perspective. 
through this method we can understand the will of its creators, the reasons behind its 
current state, and the conflict of principles that it embodies.
a. The Prudential Carve-Out interpreted in its literal sense, context, and purpose
the general rule of interpretation mandates that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose”49. Given that there are three 
official languages in the Wto, we can attempt to triangulate the ordinary meaning of 
“prudential”, as each text is equally authoritative50.
i. Interpretation of the term “prudential” in its ordinary meaning and context
the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines prudential as: “exercising prudence especially in 
business matters”, and prudence as: “careful good judgment that allows someone to avoid 
danger or risks”51.
the Real Academia de la Lengua Española defines “cautelar” as: “1. Preventivo, precautorio; 
2. Dicho de una medida o de una regla destinada a prevenir la consecución de determina-
do fin o precaver lo que pueda dificultarlo”52. “Prudencial” is defined as 1. Perteneciente 
o relativo a la prudencia. 2. Que no es exagerado ni excesivo”53.
the Larousse defines “prudence” as: “Attitude de quelqu’un qui est attentif à tout ce 
qui peut causer un dommage, qui réfléchit aux conséquences de ses actes et qui agit de 
manière à éviter toute erreur”. And “prudent/prudente” as “Qui fait preuve de prudence, 
de circonspection dans ses actes, de grande attention dans les situations qui comportent 
des dangers”54.
Although in colombia’s ftas the term “cautelares” found in the spanish afs pruden-
tial carve-out has been replaced by “prudenciales”, we can see that the original term 
is richer in content and more compatible with the English and French definitions of 
“prudential”. Present in the three definitions, is the idea of upcoming circumstances, 
and the need of thinking/acting ahead to avoid the occurrence of particular harm. One 
48 Understanding on rules and Procedures Governing the settlement of Disputes, 1869 u.n.t.s. 401, 
Article 3.2 [dsu].
49 vienna convention on the Law of treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 unts 331; 8 iLm 679, Article 31.1 [vclT].
50 vclT Article 33.1.
51 Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Merriam-Webster.com) sub verbo “prudence”.
52 Diccionario de la lengua española (22. Ed. rae.es) sub verbo “cautelar”. 
53 Diccionario de la lengua española (22. Ed. rae.es) sub verbo “prudencial”. 
54 Larouse (Larouse.fr) sub verbos “prudence” “prudent/prudente”. 
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must not, however, equate the dictionary definitions with the ordinary meaning of the 
terms under analysis. Although this approach is a good place to start, as noted by the 
Appellate body in several occasions, dictionaries are not sufficient in resolving complex 
questions of interpretation55.
the concept of preventing the occurrence of a certain harmful situation harmonizes 
perfectly with the context56 surrounding the term “prudential”. the provision is drafted 
in a way that allows the existence of measures for prudential reasons, in spite of the obli-
gations that have been established throughout the agreement. some see the prudential 
carve-out as an exception, a clause that legitimizes a behavior that would otherwise be 
contrary to the commitments acquired in the agreement57. Others maintain that through 
these measures there is no violation to the contracted obligations in the first place, as 
the provision “carves-out” or withdraws such measures from the agreement’s scope of 
application and its substantive obligations58. Another approach focusing on the tech-
nique of legal drafting, can center its attention on the term “notwithstanding”, which 
attributes the clause greater priority than the rest, rendering any clauses it may overlap, 
or conflict with, as none-existent59.
In any case, the objective of protecting investors, depositors, policy holders, and 
creditors of fiduciary duties, and the integrity and stability of the system as a whole, is 
regarded as crucial enough for prudential measures to ignore, or justify the inobservance 
of, gats obligations. However, the carve-out expressly warns against abusing the right 
to take such measures as their purpose cannot be the none-compliance of gats obliga-
tions. the Wto has touched on the abuse of rights doctrine. In us – Shrimp the Appellate 
body stated that as an expression of the principle of good faith, this doctrine “prohibits 
the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right 
‘impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, 
55 United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (Complaint by Antigua 
y Barbuda) (2005) Wto Doc Wt/ds285/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.164 [us - Gambling]; United 
States — Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (Complaint by 
Canada) (2004) Wto Doc Wt/ds257/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.59 [us – Softwood Lumber iv]; Ca-
nada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Complaint by Brazil) (1999) Wto Doc Wt/ds70/ab/r 
(Appellate body report) para.153; European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing 
Asbestos (Complaint by Canada) (2001) Wto Doc Wt/ds135/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.92; China 
— Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products (Complaint by United States) (2009) Wto Doc Wt/ds363/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.348 
[China - Publications].
56 Argentina — Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Complaint by European Communities) (1999) Wto Doc 
Wt/ds121/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.81, footnote 72; United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton 
(Complaint by Brazil) (2005) Wto Doc Wt/ds267/ab/r (Appellate body report) paras.549-550; Korea — 
Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products (Complaint by European Communities) (1999) Wto 
Doc Wt/ds98/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.81.
57 Castro-Riberos pp. 136-138; Bogdandy & Windsor p. 634.
58 Wto Doc, s/fin/W/73 Background Note by the Secretariat (3 February 2010) para.29.
59 kennetH a. adams, “Drafting Matters” nY. Lw. Jrnl. backpage (5 July 5 2002) (QL). 
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that is to say, reasonably’”60. therefore, we can see how a measure’s possible incongrui-
ties with gats commitments are accepted as collateral damage provided that there is a 
“reasonable means to ends connection” with the prudential reason61.
As recognized by the Appellate body in India – Patents, the principles of treaty in-
terpretation enshrined in vcLt Article 31 “neither require nor condone the imputation 
into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts 
that were not intended”62. therefore we must be careful not to introduce alien concepts 
into the prudential carve-out, despite their familiarity. Examples of such concepts are 
precisely those that switzerland, the European Union, and Israel, have introduced in 
their fta prudential carve-outs as seen above. terms like: “not more trade restrictive than 
necessary”, found in the sps and tbt agreements63 or “not more burdensome than neces-
sary”, found in gats vi.4 as criteria for domestic regulation, are absent in the prudential 
carve out. Moreover, the prudential carve out differs significantly from the gats general 
exception in Article xiv that requires the Member to prove the necessity of a measure 
for its application64. We should therefore overcome the temptation of supplementing 
the nonexistent case law on the prudential carves out, with the ample jurisprudence on 
such standards65.
Interpretation in the literal sense may seem to be obvious or a waste of time, and 
indeed in several occasions it can be a dull and unchallenging exercise. However, the 
result of a mediocre or lacking literal interpretation can lead to horrendous interpre-
tations and astoundingly ridiculous claims. to exemplify, let us observe the following 
claim regarding the gats prudential carve-out:
As the second sentence makes clear, the provision may only be used to defend regulatory 
policies if such policies do not undermine the commitments and obligations established 
through the other Wto rules. this effectively eviscerates the use of the provision to protect 
60 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Complaint by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Thailand) (1998) Wto Doc Wt/ds58/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.158, footnote 156 [us - Shrimp] 
citing cHeng, b. “ General Principles of Law as applied by International courts and tribunals” (1953) 
stevens and sons Ltd. p. 125.
61 Castro-Riberos p. 141.
62 India — Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (Complaint by United States) (1997) 
Wto Doc Wt/ds50/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.45. 
63 Agreement on the Application of sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 1867 u.n.t.s. 493, Article 5.6 
[sps]; Agreement on technical barriers to trade, 1868 u.n.t.s. 120, Article 2.2 [TbT].
64 gaTs Article xiv; see also Yokoi-Arai p. 624.
65 For example: Australia — Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Complaint by Canada) (1998) Wto Doc Wt/
ds18/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.194; Japan — Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (Complaint by 
United States) (1999) Wto Doc Wt/ds76/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.95; Korea — Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Complaint by United States) (2000) Wto Doc Wt/ds161/ab/r (Appellate 
body report) para.161; Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Complaint by European Communities) 
(2007) Wto Doc Wt/ds332/ab/r (Appellate body report) paras.145-146; United states — Measures 
concerning the Importation, Marketing and sale of tuna and tuna Products (complaint by Mexico) 
(2012) Wto Doc Wt/ds381/ab/r (Appellate body report) paras.318-320.
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domestic regulatory policies that a country may have in place or may newly implement from 
Wto challenge66.
the authors have interpreted the final sentence of the provision, which warns against 
abusing the right to adopt prudential measures, as a negation to the right itself, rende-
ring the provision meaningless and useless. nothing could be farther from the correct 
interpretation of the prudential carve-out. Granted, the quoted article far from peru-
sing academic correctness is centered on promoting a political discourse, but the root 
of the error is a failed interpretation of the literal terms in their context. the context 
comprises the entire text of the treaty and includes the preamble67 which in this case is 
a particularly helpful aide in our interpretation.
ii. The Prudential Carve-Out in light of the Object and Purpose of the gaTs
A treaty’s preamble may shed light as to its object and purpose: “[t]he preamble is a prin-
ciple and natural source from which indications can be gathered of a treaty’s objects and 
purpose”68. International tribunals have made substantial use of it69 and the Appellate 
body is no exception70. the Appellate body has also emphasized that the “object and 
purpose” of the vcLt’s Article 31.1 refers to the treaty as a whole, not specific provi-
sions, although the “object and purpose” of a specific provision should harmonize with 
the object and purpose of the entire treaty71. With this in mind, the analysis of three 
paragraphs of the gats preamble reveals two clear goals: the wish for progressive libe-
ralization (Paragraph 2), and the recognition of the Members’ right to regulate in order 
to meet national policy objectives (Paragraph 4).
66 todd tucker & Lori WaLLacH, “no Meaningful safeguards for Prudential Measures in the World 
trade Organization’s Financial service Deregulation Agreements” (2009) Public citizen, (QL) p. 5. 
67 vclT Article 31.2.
68 case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-bissau v senegal) Judgment of 12 no-
vember 1991 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry [1991] icj rep 130 p. 142; see also mitcHeL 
p. 33; HoLger Hestermeyer, “Preamble gats” in ruideger WoLfrum, peter-tobais stoLL, & cLemens 
feinaugLe, eds., Max Planck commentaries on World trade Law: Wto trade in services (Leiden- bos-
ton: Martinus nijhoff Publishers, 2008) 17, p. 19 [Hestermeyer].
69 us Nationals in Morocco p.196; Asylum case (colombia v Peru) Judgment of 20 november 1950 [1950] 
icj rep 266, p. 282; case concerning the beagle channel (Argentina v chile) “Award of the tribunal” 
(18 February 1971) 57, para.19. 
70 us – Softwood Lumber iv para.64; Argentina — Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other Items 
(Complaint by United States) (1998) Wto Doc Wt/ds56/ab/r (Appellate body report) para 47; us – Gambling 
paras.188–189; us – Shrimp para.153.
71 European Communities — Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts (Complaint by Brazil) (2005) Wto 
Doc Wt/ds269/ab/r (Appellate body report) paras.238-239.
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Preamble Paragraph 2 Preamble Paragraph 4
Wishing to establish a multilateral framework 
of principles and rules for trade in services with 
a view to the expansion of such trade under 
conditions of transparency and progressive 
liberalization…
recognizing the right of Members to regulate, 
and to introduce new regulations, on the supply 
of services within their territories in order to 
meet national policy objectives...
Preamble Paragraph 3
Desiring the early achievement of progressively higher levels of liberalization of trade in services 
through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed at promoting the interests of all 
participants on a mutually advantageous basis and at securing an overall balance of rights and 
obligations, while giving due respect to national policy objectives.
Paragraph three reveals the desire to balance both concepts. the balancing of these two 
objectives, progressive liberalization and regulatory space for national policy objectives 
could be seen as a greater objective in of itself.
Progressive liberalization in the gats has been recognized as a principle by Appellate 
body in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products stating:
the principle of progressive liberalization is reflected in the structure of the gats, which 
contemplates that Wto Members undertake specific commitments through successive rounds 
of multilateral negotiations with a view to liberalizing their services markets incrementally...72
In the same report, the Appellate body regarding the Members’ right to regulate states 
“Wto Members’ regulatory requirements may be Wto-consistent in one of two ways. 
First, they may simply not contravene any Wto obligation. secondly, even if they con-
travene a Wto obligation, they may be justified under an applicable exception”73. seeking 
to debunk myths and falsehoods about the gats, the Wto secretariat has explained that 
“the right to regulate is one of the fundamental premises of the gats” and that “the right 
to regulate and to introduce new regulations is explicitly guaranteed in the gats, and 
that the gats has no power to abolish regulation”74.
As evidenced, both of these objectives clearly intend to permeate the legal framework 
of the gats. In the preamble they abide harmoniously75, and striking this balance can 
also been as one of the treaty’s purposes in Paragraph three. the challenge is therefore 
maintaining that balance in our interpretation of the prudential carve-out. We can see 
the right to regulate in the wording, and mere existence of, the prudential carve-out. 
We can also see the objective of progressive liberalization in its final sentence that warns 
against abusing such right with the purpose of avoiding contracted commitments.
72 China – Publications para.397.
73 Ibid., para.223.
74 Wto secretariat, “gats Fact and Fiction” (2001) (QL) pp. 11, 14.
75 Hestermeyer p. 27.
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b. Recourse to Supplementary Means of Interpretation
recourse to supplementary means of interpretation is undertaken for one of two reasons. 
On the one hand, when the primary rule still leaves the meaning ambiguous or leads to 
absurd results76, or to confirm the meaning resulting from applying the general rule77. Had 
the authors of the previously discussed absurd interpretation of the prudential carve-out 
by Public Citizen sought recourse to this aide, their unreasonable result would have been 
corrected. Our interpretation following the general rule has not lead to contradictions, 
yet the scope of the provision is not entirely clear. We can draw a few assertions:
• The prudential reasons that inspire the taking of measures covered by the carve-
out are considered important enough to merit creating a safeguard clause specifically 
for financial services, unlike any other in the Wto context, which does not incorporate 
frequently used standards such as: necessity, not more burdensome than necessary or 
least trade restrictive tests.
• Such prudential reasons enable the measures covered by the carve-out to ignore 
or not comply with acquired commitments despite all other provisions in the treaty.
• The prudential reasons are not listed exhaustively but include examples of finan-
cial services consumers that are creditors of the system (traditional approach), and the 
integrity and stability of the financial system as a whole. this does not mean that the 
protection of financial services consumers of another nature could not be a legitimate 
objective since domestic regulations evidence concern towards them as well.
• The concept of “prudential” is linked to an idea of thinking/acting ahead to avoid 
certain harmful circumstances.
• The concept of abus de droit is present in the provision and measures undertaken 
cannot be used to avoid gats commitments, remaining genuinely linked to the prudential 
reasons through a reasonable means to ends connection.
• The prudential carve-out is does not contain elements that configure the chapeau 
of other Wto exceptions like the terms “necessary” and “not more burdensome than 
necessary”.
• The prudential carve-out provision reflects two gats objectives/principles, progres-
sive liberalization and the right to regulate, and the desire to find balance between them.
76 vclT Article 32; Canada — Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products (Com-
plaint by United States) (1999) Wto Doc Wt/ds103/ab/r (Appellate body report) para.138; Ec – Computer 
Equipment para.86; us – Gambling para.197. 
77 United States — Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany (Com-
plaint by European Communities) (2002) Wto Doc Wt/ds213/ab/r (Appellate body report) paras.89-90; 
China — Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Complaint by United States) 
(2009) Wto Doc Wt/ds362/r (Panel report) para.7.260; see also Evans p. 186.
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Analyzing the prudential carve-out through the supplementary means of interpretation 
serves to confirm these claims and clarify the will of the Members regarding the balance 
between the right to regulate and progressive liberalization in the prudential carve-out.
c. Preparatory Works: The initial positions regarding the wording of the exception  
in the context of the negotiations for the creation of the wto
Analyzing the drafting history of the covered agreements has been useful to the Appellate 
body78. It provides a window into the conflicting interests and positions of the Mem-
bers and the process of how consent was ultimately reached. the negotiating history 
of the prudential carve-out in the afs is rich in detail as the nature of the issue was, and 
is, sensitive to the Members.
the Group of negotiations on services (gns) of the Multilateral trade negotiations 
(mtn) during the Uruguay round developed the prudential carve-out during the second 
semester of 1990. the inclusion of a prudential carve-out provision was not debated 
since every delegation recognized the importance of establishing such a clause in the 
agreement. the discussion centered on the content of the prudential carve-out, which 
would determine the limits of a state’s right to regulate.
Initially, there were five possible ways in which such a provision could be established, 
ranging from a broad to a narrow scope:
1. the first option was to incorporate the concept in a qualified national treatment 
provision.
2. the second option allowed all prudential measures to the extent that they were 
reasonable.
3. A third option, building up on the previous one, proposed the inclusion of per-
missible measures, not as an exhaustive list but rather as examples.
4. the radically broad fourth option sought an unqualified right to adopt such measures.
5. Lastly, a fifth option, seeking to reduce legal uncertainty to minimum, aimed at a 
precise definition of permitted prudential actions79.
the first option, which limited the prudential carve-out to a qualified national treatment 
provision was quickly discarded the great majority of delegations. For India, prudential 
regulations “cut across” the entirety of subjects discussed by the gns80. the European 
communities stated that prudential regulation was also compatible to the rest of the 
78 Canada — Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Complaint by United States) (1997) Wto Doc Wt/ds31/ab/r 
(Appellate body report) paras.33-34.; India — Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products (Complaint by United States) (1999) wTo Doc wT/ds90/ab/R (Appellate Body Report) para.94; 
United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea 
(Complaint by Korea) (2002) Wto Doc Wt/ds202/ab/r (Appellate body report) paras.171-175.
79 Wto Doc, mtn.gns/fin/1 Note on the Meeting of 11-13 June 1990 (5 July 1990) para.78 [mTn.gns/fin/1].
80 Ibid., para.81.
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agreements provisions for instance most favored nation treatment, and access to mar-
kets81. Likewise, canada held that it was “extremely important” to have prudential pro-
visions that allowed governments and regulators to take the actions required to protect 
their markets. In this sense, there was no reason for the provision to apply exclusively to 
national treatment, and should be extended to any other provision in the agreement82. 
Only the Australian delegation considered option one as viable, however it also was 
inclined towards the second one83.
Following the consensus on discarding the first option, we can identify three main 
stances taken by the delegations. In the first place, those which promoted the precisely 
defined scope of the fifth option like switzerland and south Africa. secondly, those 
which advocated for a strong right of regulation and the greatest degree of discretion 
for adopting prudential measures, like the seacen countries. And lastly, a significant 
majority that aimed for the middle ground provided by the second option.
Defending the fifth option, switzerland stressed that conflicts arising from the 
application of regulation should be subjected to dispute settlement, and consequently 
discarded the unqualified right to regulate proposed by the fourth option. the dispute 
settlement mechanism however, would be burdened by the reasonableness test of the 
second option. the broad approach of the second option would also be detrimental to 
the legal certainty increasingly sought for by market participants84.
For south Africa, the prudential carve out was the most important part of the agree-
ment. the delegation was sympathetic of a precise scope, discarding the fourth option 
like switzerland, and considering the fifth as the most appropriate. Option two would 
be acceptable only if “reasonable actions” could be defined in equally precise terms85.
Malaysia, speaking for the south East Asian central banks (seacen) countries: 
Indonesia, Korea, nepal, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, singapore, sri Lanka and 
thailand, stated that as small and developing nations with very open economies, they 
were vulnerable to external influences, and as such, their stance aimed at protecting the 
stability of the financial system. they held that liberalization should take into account 
the characteristics of developing countries’ relatively immature financial systems, in 
light of the system’s role in achieving socio-economic development objectives. In short, 
liberalization should not jeopardize a developing nation’s economic and financial stabi-
lity86. In their view, this objective required maximum flexibility for prudential reasons, 
prioritizing depositor and investor interests.
Furthermore, the seacen countries argued that due to the needs of particular coun-
tries, and for the measures to be effective with an element of surprise, they should not 
81 Ibid., para.82.
82 Ibid., para.79.
83 Ibid., para.84.
84 Ibid., para.87.
85 Ibid., para.88.
86 Wto Doc, mtn.gns/fin/3 Note on the Meeting of 13-15 September 1990 (16 October 1990) para.4 [mTn.gns/
fin/3].
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be subjected previous consultations or dispute settlement. thailand added that it was 
best for each country to decide the necessity of a measure in a particular situation, an 
analysis not be questioned through the dispute settlement mechanism87. singapore cri-
ticized the second option, considering that due to different philosophies for banking 
regulation and supervision as well as different standards among countries, the element 
of reasonableness was very subjective88.
the seacen position was shared by other developing countries, Mexico agreed that 
any degree of financial liberalization should provide due account of prudential conside-
rations and the development objectives of developing countries89.
As mentioned above, most delegations took the middle-ground, rejecting that the 
prudential carve-out should establish an unqualified right to regulate, and also rejecting 
a precise definition that would limit the provision’s scope. this position was strongly 
defended by canada, Japan, Australia, the United states, the European communities, 
and the nordic countries.
After rejecting the limitation of the prudential carve out to a qualified national 
treatment provision, the canadian delegation preferred the second option, and to 
counteract the possible abuse of such provision, submitted that it should be subjected 
to dispute settlement90. Japan took a very similar position, balancing liberalization and 
the policy objective of maintaining fair and orderly markets, adding that the prudential 
carve-out should also be subjected to notification obligations91.
Australia considered it fundamental that countries retain sufficient power to mana-
ge their financial systems prudentially, and noting the difficulty of negotiating the fifth 
option, initially sided with options one and two. since the concept of reasonable would 
also be difficult to define, there should instead be a broad consensus on the matter92.
For the United states, the prudential carve-out was also vital. the scope proposed 
by the delegation was measures which were “reasonably necessary” for the protection of: 
the financial service provider, the customer, and the strength and stability of the financial 
system as a whole. these measures were not to be taken to circumvent the agreement. 
Furthermore, the prudential carve-out must allow the entrance of new products into 
markets, due to the increasing innovation in the financial sector93.
the fourth option, defended by the seacen countries, that promoted an unquali-
fied right of regulation, faced strong responses by the rest of delegations. switzerland’s 
answer to the seacen position recognized that the right to regulate was of central im-
portance, however if understood as broadly, this right could result in a derogation of 
87 mTn.gns/fin/1 para.83.
88 Ibid., para.91.
89 mTn.gns/fin/3 para.8.
90 mTn.gns/fin/1 para.79.
91 mTn.gns/fin/1 para.80; Wto Doc, mtn.gns/fin/2 Note on the Meeting of 12-13 July 1990 (10 August 1990) 
para.27 [mTn.gns/fin/2].
92 mTn.gns/fin/1 para.84.
93 mTn.gns/fin/2 para.25.
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the agreement’s provisions. In this sense, the right should be qualified to ensure that it 
could not be abused in a way that would distort trade94. this concern was shared by the 
European communities, for whom a major concern was ensuring a balance between the 
right to regulate for prudential reasons, and avoiding the abusive use of said right. the 
seacen proposal could result in de-liberalization by providing an excess of regulatory 
discretion and a lack of transparency95. canada agreed that some form of recourse should 
be available to prudential decisions and withdrawing these from the dispute settlement 
mechanism would create a significant loophole96.
Japan added that prudential considerations were not exclusive to developing countries 
and were important for all nations, although the concept of prudential measures could 
be different for each country depending on its level of development97.
Ultimately, it was the nordic countries’ position that was found to be the most accep-
table. the swedish delegation, speaking on their behalf, considered that the provision 
should clearly delineate the scope of prudential regulation. taking a stance against the 
fourth option that could lead to discriminatory and inappropriate rules, and recognizing 
the difficulty of having a reasonableness test, sweden proposed combining the second 
option with a variation of the third. this would be done by including an illustrative 
list of legitimate objectives, rather than legitimate measures as initially contemplated. 
these legitimate objectives could include: the protection of fair and orderly markets, 
the protection of depositors, investors, insurance policy holders and consumers, and the 
prevention of inappropriate practices98.
tAbLE 1. tHE MEMbErs’ POsItIOns bAsED On tHEIr PArtIcIPAtIOn As EvIDEncED In tHE MInUtEs
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5
Australia
canada
Japan
the European 
communities
India
Australia
sweden and the nordic 
countries
usa
sweden and the 
nordic countries
Indonesia,
Korea,
nepal,
Malaysia, 
Myanmar, 
Philippines, 
singapore,
sriLanka thailand
switzerland
south Africa
In these discussions we can revere the tension between the desire for progressive li-
beralization, and the importance of protecting a state’s right to regulate. As stated by 
94 mTn.gns/fin/3 para.11.
95 Ibid., para.12.
96 Ibid., para.15.
97 Ibid., para.22.
98 mTn.gns/fin/1 para.85.
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many delegations, negotiating the prudential carve-out provision to finer detail would 
be exceedingly difficult given the heterogeneous group of Members, the state of their 
financial systems and economic development, and their banking and regulatory philo-
sophies. We can confirm the abovementioned assertions regarding the prudential carve 
out, and add to them the following:
• For many Members the prudential carve-out was the most important part of the 
agreement.
• The Members strongly rejected the application of the prudential carve-out ex-
clusively to national treatment commitments, and desired to cover all commitments.
• Most Members sought to balance progressive liberalization and a State’s right to 
regulate.
• The final sentence of the prudential carve-out was incorporated to prevent a loo-
phole, and this was also to be achieved by subjecting prudential measures to dispute 
settlement.
• Members could agree on examples of legitimate objectives that motivate the “pru-
dential reasons”, but avoided discussing examples of prudential measures.
• The term “reasonable” was left out of the provision due to the difficulty of defining it.
• Switzerland already disliked a broad prudential carve-out, giving more weight to 
the predictability and stability sought by financial service suppliers.
these documents give count of the Member states’ will in the 1990’s during the 
conformation of the Wto. but perhaps these positions have changed over the years? We 
will now analyze the present day attitude of the member states towards the prudential 
cave-out provision.
v. tHE MEMbEr stAtEs’ WILL In DEtErMInInG tHE cOntEnt OF tHE ExcEPtIOn  
In tHE cOMMIttEE On FInAncIAL sErvIcEs
In late 2011 Ecuador presented an ambitious proposal for furthering work on regulatory 
measures in financial services before the committee on trade i Financial services (cfs)99. 
comparing the dimension of the 2008 financial crisis to that of the Great Depression, 
Ecuador pointed out that regulatory reforms were being implemented everywhere. As 
evidence of this, Ecuador cited the G-20 Declaration on strengthening the Financial 
system of April 2009, the Group of thirty Financial reform: A Framework for Financial 
stability of 2009, and the icmb/cepr Geneva reports on the World Economy n.º 11 – 
the Fundamental Principles of Financial regulation of 2009. through the inclusion of a 
mandate in the upcoming Ministerial Declaration, Ecuador sought that the committee 
in Financial services review Wto rules, with the purpose of promoting and preserving 
99 Wto Doc, s/fin/W/80 Communication from Ecuador “Proposal for furthering work on Regulatory Measures in Financial 
Services for inclusion in the Ministerial Declaration” (7 October 2011) [s/fin/w/80].
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policy space for macro-prudential regulation directed at protecting the stability and 
integrity of the financial system.
before the cfs, Ecuador advocated further for the “construction of a new internatio-
nal financial architecture”100, seeking that the Wto adapt its rules to the new regulatory 
reality, as opposed to the old academic and regulatory paradigms of the 1990’s101. this 
proposal received immediate support from the representatives of Argentina, barbados, 
bolivia, brazil, cuba, the Dominican republic, India, and south Africa, which consi-
dered that the cfs should review relevant rules in financial services due to the recent 
developments102.
to the contrary, the representatives of chinese taipei, the eu, Korea, norway, 
Australia, and the United states did not approve of including such a paragraph in the 
upcoming Ministerial Declaration, or the review of existing Wto rules. they maintained 
that the gats and the afs, particularly the prudential carve-out, already provided a high 
level of discretion for appropriate policy space, and at the same time excluded purely 
protectionist measures. canada expressed that the prudential carve-out had functioned 
adequately providing the member states flexibility in safeguarding their financial sys-
tems103. However they did welcome further discussion on the financial crisis, particularly 
the exchange of views and experiences104.
As the meeting was the committee’s last for that year, and no consensus was reached, 
the proposed mandate did not find its way into the ministerial conference declaration. 
However, the substance of the discussion lived on, as suggested by the representative 
of turkey, since the subject matter of the discussion already fell within the committee’s 
mandate. turkey also suggested that the secretariat prepare a note on the “legal meaning 
and scope of the prudential carve out, including examples of prudential regulations”105.
the discussion continued in 2012 with Ecuador’s submission of a reviewed and more 
detailed proposal106. Although more concrete and comprehensive, Ecuador’s new proposal 
lacked the edge that had made the previous one so controversial. Ecuador recognized 
that the desire of preparing a legal interpretation of gats rules relating to the need for 
macro-prudential regulation, or identifying specific measures within the scope of Wto 
provisions was not viable107. Many members were concerned that such a discussion could 
result in narrowing the scope of the existing provisions108.
100 Wto Doc, s/fin/m/71 Report of the Meeting held on 31 October 2011 (4 november 2011) para.47 [s/fin/m/71].
101 s/fin/m/71 para.49.
102 Ibid., para.51.
103 Ibid., para.54.
104 Ibid., paras.52,53,55.
105 Ibid., paras.55,57.
106 Wto Doc, s/fin/W/84 Communication from Ecuador “Proposal for discussing progress in respect of macro-prudential 
regulation and its relationship with gaTs rules” (26 June 2012) [s/fin/w/84].
107 s/fin/w84 para.14; Wto Doc, s/fin/m/73 Report of the Meeting held on 27 June 2012 (30 July 2012) para.8 [s/
fin/m/73].
108 Wto Doc, s/fin/m/72 Report of the Meeting held on 19 March 2012 (31 May 2012) paras.10,13,14,15,17,20,22; 
s/fin/m/73 para.8.
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Ecuador’s second proposal involves only “dedicated discussion on the steps forward 
that have been proposed at (an) international level in respect of macro-prudential re-
gulation and its relationship with gats rules”109. not quite the construction of the new 
international financial architecture mentioned earlier. As questions proposed for the 
discussion and the sharing of views and experiences, Ecuador submitted the following110:
a. What types of new macro-prudential measures have countries identified in recent 
years and why are they considered necessary in relation to those in existence prior to 
the recent crisis?
b. How do such measures relate to trade in financial services and the objective of 
maintaining a solid financial system?
c. Must the Wto cooperate with other international bodies in discussing regulatory 
needs to ensure consistency with new emerging standards such as the imf’s macro-pru-
dential policy standards?
this proposal received a warmer welcome in the cfs, from both the previous suppor-
ters and dissenters. the turkish delegation that had avidly supported discussing the 
scope of the prudential carve-out, after acknowledging the concerns of many members, 
proposed undertaking the discussion suggested by Ecuador on the condition that it be 
non-binding. In this way, the exchange of views and experiences could be had without 
raising the concerns that had previously dissuaded many members111. bolivia, brazil, 
cuba, chile, Argentina, India, and the republic of Korea, supported Ecuador’s proposal 
without an express reservation112.
the approach suggested by turkey was accepted by many of the critics of Ecuador’s 
first proposal. Although the United states remained cautious, the delegation appreciated 
that Ecuador was not seeking a legal interpretation of gats rules relating to macro-pru-
dential regulation, or a list of measures that falls within such scope. the United states 
characterized such legal interpretation of the prudential carve-out to be “self-defeating 
in terms of its original objective”113. Likewise, the delegations of south Africa, Egypt, 
Pakistan, Australia, the Philippines, switzerland, Mexico, nigeria, singapore, the 
Dominican republic, chinese taipei, and Hong Kong china, supported the proposal, 
although stating clearly that it should not lead to an interpretation of the prudential 
carve-out114.
With this feedback, Ecuador expressly clarified the parameters of the dedicated 
discussion to be the following115:
109 s/fin/w/84 para.16.
110 s/fin/w/84 para.17.
111 Wto Doc, s/fin/m/74 Report of the Meeting held on 1 October 2012 (16 november 2012) para.16 [s/fin/m/74]. 
112 s/fin/m/74 paras.17,18,19,22,23. 
113 Ibid., para.21.
114 Ibid., paras.24,25,27,28,29,32,33,34,35,37,39,40.
115 Wto Doc, s/fin/m/75 Report of the Meeting held on 5 December 2012 (21 December 2012) para.8 [s/fin/m/75]. 
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1. It would not lead to an interpretation of gats rules
2. It would serve to corroborate the flexibility of the current rules on the adoption 
of prudential regulation
3. It would not seek to identify a list of measures considered as falling within the 
scope of the gats framework
4. It would seek to preserve the breadth of the current rules
5. the experiences shared within would only be considered as examples of relevant 
practices
6. It would not be used to prejudge specific measures taken by the Members
7. It would not seek to prescribe a macro-prudential policy to be necessarily com-
plied with
On these terms, all the delegations accepted the dedicated discussion116.
From these documents, we can draw a clear picture on the Members’ current attitude 
towards the prudential cave-out. 24 years later, it remains unchanged for the most part. 
Although some Members, mainly developing countries, seek a better understanding on 
prudential regulatory measures, the great majority of Members are zealous on keeping 
the broad scope of the prudential carve-out, and the flexibility that its wording seemingly 
provides. Moreover, Members are not interested in questioning the measures taken by 
others, or identifying specific measures considered as complaint with the gats regulatory 
framework. In short, it seems that most Wto Members have no interest in exploring the 
carve-out’s limits, and find refuge in the fog of the provision’s ambiguous scope.
It is not clear whether all members are as content with the provision as its most 
avid advocators like canada, the United states, and Japan, but ultimately none bring 
forth their unconformities in the multilateral level. there seem to be few heavyweight 
nonconformists (switzerland and the European Union), and they seek to imprint their 
variations of the prudential carve-out only in bilateral instruments, letting the classic 
prudential carve out reign free on the multi- and plurilateral levels.
From its genesis, the prudential carve-out’s wording was not incidental or pre-fa-
bricated. It is the product of serious negotiations and the confrontation of many wills, 
wishes, philosophies and standards. the drafting of the provision itself was prudential. 
Extreme and radical positions were discarded, whether they called out for an unlimi-
ted and unquestionable right to regulate, or for the detailed and minute delineation of 
such right. Dispute settlement would prevent abuse of the provision’s broad wording 
by purely protectionist measures, or any other loophole. We can also note how it was 
easier to agree on legitimate objectives, rather than specific measures that fall within the 
provision’s scope. In this sense, we can conclude that there is no disagreement on the 
116 s/fin/m/75 paras.10-cuba, 11-Hong Kong china, 12-china, 13-brazil, 14-bolivia, 15-eu, 16-usa, 17-chi-
le, singapour, switzerland, venezuela, 18-turkey, 19-south Africa, 20-canada, 21-Japan, 22-Korea, 
23-Phillipinnes, 24-Mexico, 25-Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, thailand, 28. 
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prudential carve-out’s finality, the goals and objectives that it should strive for. Yet the 
means, the measures themselves and the term “prudential”, remain consciously ignored.
vI. DIsPUtE sEttLEMEnt In tHE afs As A WInDOW FOr cOnsOLIDAtInG tHE tErM 
PrUDEntIAL
the prudential carve-out is not the only unique provision in afs that sets it apart from 
other Wto disciplines. From the negotiating history of the prudential carve-out we can 
see how sensitive the matter is, and the importance that the Members gave to dispute 
settlement as the means to avoid abuse of the provision. For these reasons afs Paragra-
ph 4 adds a special rule for dispute settlement: “Panels for disputes on prudential issues 
and other financial matters shall have the necessary expertise relevant to the specific 
financial service under dispute”.
this rule is recognized in Appendix 2 of the dsu relating to “special or Additional 
rules and Procedures contained in the covered Agreements”. these special rules prevail 
over the general dsu provisions when there is a conflict between them, but generally fit 
together with the general rules “to form a comprehensive, integrated dispute settlement 
system for the Wto Agreement”117. In the Appellate body’s view, “[t]he special or additional 
provisions listed in Appendix 2 of the dsu are designed to deal with the particularities of 
dispute settlement relating to obligations arising under a specific covered agreement”118.
afs Paragraph 4 establishes a key particularity. Article 8 of the dsu already mandates 
that Panels are to be composed of “well-qualified” individuals, but the afs goes beyond 
that, expressly requiring “expertise”. Given that the term “expertise” is said of the panels, 
and not expressly of panelists, some have interpreted that at least one of the panelists 
must be an expert in finance119.
taking this one step further: what are the implications of the expressly required ex-
pertise being present in a panel deciding on a prudential issue? the main consequence 
is that a strictly lawful interpretation of the prudential carve-out, in accordance with the 
customary rules of interpretation of treaties, done with the upmost academic rigor, will 
not be enough. If such method would suffice, there would be no need of afs paragraph 
4, as the dsu’s already well qualified panelists should be well versed in the transversal 
technique of customary treaty interpretation. dsu paragraph 4 calls for something be-
yond the analysis of the prudential carve-out undertaken up to this point. It calls for the 
knowledge of an expert. consequently, what knowledge would an expert bring into a 
dispute on prudential issues? We undertake this below, where we contend that through 
the use of concepts developed in financial law and regulation, the concept of “prudential” 
could be made less ambiguous by a panel deciding on prudential issues.
117 Guatemala — Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Complaint by Mexico) (1998), 
Wto Doc Wt/ds60/ab/r (Appellate body report) paras 65-66 [Guatemala – Cement I]; Van den Bossche p.188. 
118 Guatemala – Cement 1 para.66.
119 Bogdandy & Windsor p. 638.
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vII. An ExAMPLE: LInKInG MIcrO AnD MAcrO-PrUDEntIAL POLIcY  
tO tHE PrUDEntIAL cArvE OUt
Prudence is the virtue by which we discern what is proper to do under various 
circumstances in time and place.
John Milton
In this section we aide our interpretation of the prudential carve-out with concepts and 
knowledge that would form part of the “necessary expertise” that a panel deciding on 
prudential issues would have. We base our analysis on the premise that the Wto Mem-
bers by introducing this special rule for dispute settlement, trusted and require, a panel 
deciding on prudential issues to apply its expertise. In this sense, recourse to the concepts 
developed below is not arbitrarily based on it being convenient, but rather on the will 
of the prudential carve-out’s creators.
the choice of which concepts of international finance law and regulation are useful 
in aiding the prudential carve-out’s interpretation cannot be arbitrary either. Instead, the 
choice is determined by the exact wording of the provision. the link with such concepts 
is achieved through the legitimate objectives which the prudential carve-out signals as 
examples of prudential reasons. these legitimate objectives have been developed in 
international finance law and regulation. Around the protection of financial services 
consumers (investors, depositors, persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed, etc.) and 
the integrity and stability of the financial system, we can find concrete regulatory dis-
ciplines and concepts.
the author cannot presume to know the extent of such regulatory disciplines and 
concepts, but will illustrate in a general way that an expert panel could find valuable ai-
de in two concrete disciplines. these are micro-prudential policy and macro-prudential 
policy, which can bring a more tangible meaning to the idea of prudential regulation.
recourse to these concepts is not a panacea in face the prudential carve-out’s am-
biguity as they present identity issues of their own. After the latest financial crisis, “the 
term ‘macroprudential’ has become a true buzzword”120, a “fashion statement in finan-
cial regulatory circles”121. However it does contain concrete ideas beyond its usage as 
a fad. When defining it, authors generally contrast the concept with the term “micro-
prudential”122, since the two can be seen complementary like a yin to the yang. 
Micro, and macroprudential approaches to regulation distinguish themselves through 
their objectives and in the risks that concern them. the proximate objective of macro-
prudential regulation is to limit financial system-wide distress, with the ultimate ob-
120 piet cLement, “the term ‘macro-prudential’ origins and evolution” (2010) bis Quarterly rev. (QL) p. 59 
[Clement].
121 HaL s. scott & anna geLpern, International Finance Law and Regulation (London: sweet & Maxwell, 2012) 
p. 278 [Scott & Gelpern].
122 cLaudio borio, “towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial supervision and regulation?” 
(2003) bis Working Paper n.º 128, p. 2 [Borio].
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jective of avoiding the “macroeconomic costs linked to financial instability”123. these 
macroeconomic costs refer to significant losses in the entire economy’s real output124. 
On the other hand, microprudential regulation is focused on limiting the distress to in-
dividual institutions with the ultimate objective of investor and depositor protection125.
As evidenced, microprudential regulation is concerned with the first example of a 
legitimate objective that the prudential carve-out contains: the protection of certain 
consumers of financial services, stated by borio as investors and depositors, something 
which fits into the traditionally listed creditor consumers. Macroprudential regulation is 
concerned with the second objective: the integrity and stability of the financial system. 
therefore, these two disciplines can provide more tangible criteria on “what is proper 
to do” when taking a measure to protect these legitimate objectives. they bring more 
awareness as to the risks and circumstances that put the legitimate objectives in peril, 
additionally well respected standards can be found that contain principles for avoiding 
the materialization of such risks.
a. Microprudential policy and the protection of financial services consumers
As stated above, the ultimate objective of microprudential policy is to protect financial 
services consumers which are creditors to funds within the system, and it sets out to ac-
complish that task by limiting the risk to individual institutions. this risk is referred to 
as “idiosyncratic risk” as opposed to the “systemic risk” which concerns macroprudential 
policy126. In this sense, microprudential policy is concerned with the usage of capital 
by financial institutions127. As mentioned previously, for the purpose of exemplifying 
the availability of microprudential standards to an expert Panel deciding on a pruden-
tial issue, we will focus on the legitimate objective of protecting depositors, which is 
traditionally listed in prudential carve-out provisions.
banks transform “short-term deposit funding into long term-loans”128. they receive 
funding form the public’s savings, but depositors can promptly withdraw their money. 
On the other hand, the loans granted usually have a higher maturity and “can be diffi-
cult to convert into cash on short notice”129. therefore banks must hold enough liquid 
resources to handle such withdrawals. this is difficult in situations where depositors 
123 Scott & Gelpern p. 278; Borio p. 2.
124 Borio, p. 2.
125 Ibid.
126 ivo maes, “On the origins of the bis macro-prudential approach to financial stability” (2009) national 
bank of belgium (Working Paper n.º 176) p. 3; speech by Andrew crockett, General Manager bank 
for International settlements, chairman Financial stability Forum “Marrying the micro- and macro-
prudential dimensions of financial stability” (21 september 2000) p. 2. 
127 orkida iLoLLari & gentiana gjino, “Implementation of macro- and micro-prudential regulation” (2013) 
5(1) rev. of Applied socio-Econ. research p. 84. 
128 carmen reinHart & kennetH rogoff. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton new 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009) p. 144 [Reinhart & Rogoff]. 
129 Ibid., p. xL.
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lose confidence in the safety of their savings and the public massively withdraws130. 
Microprudential policy offers several standards that seek to ensure their confidence and 
the protection of their savings.
i. The Financial Stability Board: an important standard compiler
Let us recall that before the cfs, Ecuador pointed at the 2009 G-20 Declaration on stren-
gthening the Financial system as evidence of increasing concern for financial regulation. 
Indeed, through this Declaration, the Financial stability Forum became the Financial 
stability board (fsb), extending participation from the G-10 to include the G-20, and 
providing the fsb with a stronger mandate131. the fsb seeks to “coordinate the work of 
national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies and to develop 
and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other finan-
cial sector policies”132. And in coordinating international standard setting the fsb has 
constructed a Compendium of Standards. the fsb’s members are central banks and regulators 
from the G-20 countries as well as the international organizations including the bis and 
imf, and international standard-setting bodies like the bis’ basel committee on banking 
supervision (bcbs), the International Association of Insurance supervisors (iais), and the 
International Organization for securities commission (iosco). therefore the compiled 
standards built from what these members widely accept as good principles, practices, 
or guidelines133.
these Standards are mentioned as examples of applicable expert knowledge, as the 
purpose of this work is to demonstrate how the prudential carve-out allows for such 
application. It is not the purpose of this work to argue whether such Standards are neces-
sarily the best knowledge, since compiled best practices with international pretentions 
are not without criticism134.
the fsb recognizes that the implementation of some standards must be prioritized, 
and refers to these as the key standards135. Among them are the Core Principles for Effec-
tive Banking Supervision136, developed by the bcbs and the Core Principles for Effective Deposit 
Insurance Systems137, developed jointly by the bcbs and the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers (iadi). the bcbs is committee of the bis created in 1974 after the co-
130 Ibid., p. 144.
131 Group of twenty, Press release, “Global Plan Annex: Declaration on strengthening the Financial sys-
tem” (2 April 2009).
132 Financial stability board, “About the fsb” online Financial stability board (QL). 
133 Financial stability board, “What are standards” online Financial stability board (QL). 
134 james r. bartH, gerard caprio jr. & ross Levine, “banking regulation and supervision: What Works 
best?” (2001) the World bank Policy research (Working Paper n.º 2725) p. 1.
135 Financial stability board, “Key standards for sound Financial systems” online Financial stability board 
(QL).
136 basel committee on banking supervision, “core Principles for Effective banking supervision” september 
2012, bank for International settlements [cpEbs].
137 basel committee on banking supervision & International Association of Deposit Insurers, “core Principles 
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llapse of the German private bank Herstatt, and describes itself as “the primary global 
standard-setter for the prudential regulation of banks”138. Its members are the central 
banks of: Argentina, Australia, belgium, brazil, canada, china, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong sar, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the netherlands, 
russia, saudi Arabia, singapore, south Africa, spain, sweden, switzerland, turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United states139.
the iadi is also based at the bis is a forum for deposit insurers around the world, 
having regional committees in: Africa, Asia-Pacific, the caribbean, Eurasia, Europe, 
Latin America, the Middle East and north Africa, and north America140. Members are 
legally instituted deposit insurance systems, currently summing 77, and participation 
for international non-profit institutions (like the imf, World bank, and Inter-American 
Development bank) is available in the form of Partners141.
ii. Two examples of useful standards
the core Principles for Effective banking supervision were originally issued by the bcbs 
in 1997, having revisions in 2006 and recently in 2012, and “are the de facto minimum 
standard for sound prudential regulation and supervision of banks”142. the currently 29 
principles can be broadly classified in two groups, first those that focus on the functions, 
responsibilities, and powers of supervisors (like Licensing criteria, Major acquisitions, 
and corrective and sanctioning powers), and secondly, those that focus on the prudential 
regulations and requirements for banks (like credit risk, capital adequacy, and Disclo-
sure and transparency)143. the drafting of the principles, is broad and their neutrality 
enables different approaches for their implementation “so long as the overriding goals 
are achieved”144. As mentioned above, to exemplify the availability of microprudential 
standards to an expert Panel deciding on a prudential issue, we are focusing on the 
legitimate objective of protecting depositors. A key principle in that regard would be 
Principle 24 – Liquidity risk:
for Effective Deposit Insurance systems” June 2009, bank for International settlements & International 
Association of Deposit Insurers [cpEdis].
138 bank for International settlements, “About the basel committee” online bank for International settle-
ments (QL).
139 bank for International settlements, “basel committee membership” online bank for International sett-
lements (QL).
140 International Association of Deposit Insurers, “About iadi” online International Association of Deposit 
Insurers (QL).
141 International Association of Deposit Insurers, “Members and Participants” online International Associa-
tion of Deposit Insurers (QL).
142 cpEbs p. 1.
143 Ibid., p. 9.
144 Ibid., p. 13.
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the supervisor sets prudent and appropriate liquidity requirements (which can include either 
quantitative or qualitative requirements or both) for banks that reflect the liquidity needs of 
the bank. the supervisor determines that banks have a strategy that enables prudent mana-
gement of liquidity risk and compliance with liquidity requirements. the strategy takes into 
account the bank’s risk profile as well as market and macroeconomic conditions and includes 
prudent policies and processes, consistent with the bank’s risk appetite, to identify, measure, 
evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate liquidity risk over an appropriate set of time 
horizons. At least for internationally active banks, liquidity requirements are not lower than 
the applicable basel standards145.
A measure taken for the prudential reason of protecting depositors would be more likely 
to be found genuinely prudential if it harmonizes with the objectives of Principle 24: 
it respects appropriate quantitative or qualitative liquidity requirements; it makes sure 
that banks have an adequate strategy regarding such requirements that includes the 
institution’s risk profile, market conditions, etc. these principles do not deprive the 
state of the right to regulate or limit it to a specific measure. Instead they provide a list 
of objectives that prudential measure should take into account to more effectively pro-
tect the “prudential reason”. Principles on operational risk (25) credit risk (17) market 
risks (22), for example, are drafted in the same way as Principle 24. In this way, these 
standards bring forth a list of elements that an expert panel would consider when de-
termining the reasonability of the measure’s “means to ends” connection, as required by 
the good faith standard discussed above.
the core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance systems are also drafted in a 
neutral way, “designed to be adaptable to, a broad range of country circumstances, set-
tings and structures”146. there are currently 18 core Principles classified into ten groups: 
setting objectives, mandates and powers, governance, relationship with other safety-net 
participants, membership and coverage, funding, public awareness, selected legal issues, 
failure resolution, and reimbursing depositors and recoveries147. continuing with our 
exemplification regarding the traditional legitimate objective of depositor protection, 
these Principles serve to elucidate further elements that prudential measures should 
strive for, since they are geared to making deposit insurance stronger. For example, one 
of these is the purpose in Principle 2 – Mitigating Moral Hazard:
Moral hazard should be mitigated by ensuring that the deposit insurance system contains 
appropriate design features and through other elements of the financial system safety net148.
145 cpEbs Principle 24.
146 cpEdis p. 2. 
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
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the principle does not mandate exactly how a state should mitigate moral hazard; the 
Preconditions broadly suggest good corporate governance and the adequate risk mana-
gement of individual banks149. However this mitigation is an objective that regulators 
must keep in mind. consequently, gats inconsistent measures taken by a state claiming 
“prudential reasons” in this area would be less likely to be found genuinely prudential by 
an expert Panel if they completely disregard the objective of mitigating moral hazard.
Other principles may leave less ground for discretion, for example Principle 8 re-
garding compulsory membership states:
Membership in the deposit insurance system should be compulsory for all financial institu-
tions accepting deposits from those deemed most in need of protection (eg retail and small 
business depositors) to avoid adverse selection150.
In this sense, a measure that imposes membership in the deposit insurance system to a 
foreign institution because it accepts deposits from small businesses, but not extend the 
same requirement to domestic institutions that also accept deposits from small businesses, 
would probably not prudential. In light of this principle, different treatment regarding 
compulsory membership in the deposit insurance system could only be rationally based 
on the nature of the financial institutions’ consumers.
some of the recent principle compendiums not yet categorized as “key”, include the 
fsb’s Principles for an Effective risk Appetite Framework of november 2013[151], and 
the iosco’s Principles for Financial benchmarks of July 2013[152]. the total list under 
Financial regulation and supervisions sums more than 150, and as we can see the fsb’s 
Compendium is under constant growth and revision.
iii. Moving towards integrating a macroprudential outlook
before the crisis, many thought that the minimum requirements set for banking institu-
tions were enough to keep the financial system was safe but this traditional position has 
received heavy criticism: “the current approach has been found wanting. It implicitly 
assumes that we can make the system as a whole safe by simply trying to make sure that 
individual banks are safe”153. this has been called a fallacy of composition154.
149 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
150 Ibid., p. 3.
151 Financial stability board, “Principles for an Effective risk Appetite Framework” (november 2013) (QL). 
152 board of the International Organization of securities commission, “Principles for Financial benchmarks” 
(July 2013) (QL); iosco principles would be helpful to a Panel resolving a prudential matter concerned 
with the protection of investors and fair and orderly markets, which were also of great concern as evi-
denced in the negotiating history mTn/gns/fin/1 para.85. 
153 markus brunnermeier et al. “the Fundamental Principles of Financial Market regulation” (2009) 
Geneva reports on the World Economy 11 (International centre for Monetary and banking studies & 
centre for Economic Policy research) pp. vx, 15. 
154 International Monetary Fund: Monetary and capital Markets Department “Macroprudential Policy: 
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A fallacy of composition consists in erroneously attributing a property of the cons-
tituent parts to the whole155. In this context, the soundness of individual institutions 
does not guarantee the stability of the system as a whole. Furthermore, it has been re-
cognized that “actions that are appropriate for individual firms may collectively lead 
to, or exacerbate, system-wide problems”156. In light these circumstances, additionally 
to strengthening microprudentail policy, standard setting bodies like the bcbs seek to 
include a macroprudential focus “addressing system wide risks that can build up across 
the banking sector”157. consequently, in determining whether a measure taken by a state 
for prudential reasons is genuinely prudential, an expert panel could also find aide the 
concepts developed by macroprudential policy.
b. Macroprudential Policy and the stability of the financial system
A measure adopted by a state for the prudential reason of protecting the stability of the 
financial system would be more likely to be considered as prudential if it could be cate-
gorized as falling within macroprudential policy. We will present the general aspects of 
macroprudential policy and the enemy that it faces when protecting the financial system.
i. Defining the concept of macroprudential policy
As previously warned, the term “macroprudential” has identity issues of its own. the imf 
recognizes that there is no commonly accepted definition of macroprudential policy, its 
objectives, and instruments, given that the discussion and development of the concept 
if far from being settled in academic and regulatory circles158. However, the underlying 
idea has remained constant and serves as a direct link to the second legitimate objective 
exemplified in the prudential carve-out: the integrity and stability of the financial system.
In 2010, Piet clement thoroughly analyzed the origin and evolution of the term 
macroprudential. After originating in the 1970’s “the term has always denoted concerns 
over the financial system’s stability and its link with the macroeconomy”159. the focus 
of the concerns has varied, ranging from “excessive lending to developing countries” 
to “the impact of financial innovation and the development of capital markets”160. the 
An Organizing Framework” (14 March 2011) p. 9 [imf-Organizing Framework]; stepHen morris & Hyun 
sHin, “Financial regulation in a systemic context” (2008) brookings Papers on Economic Activity 229, 
p. 272.
155 Hans Hansen & robert pinto, Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Pennsylvania: Penn state 
Press, 1995) p. 141.
156 imf-Organizing Framework p. 9.
157 basel committee on banking supervision, “strengthening the resilience of the banking sector” (2009) 
consultative Document p. 2 [bcbs-Strengthening]. 
158 imf-Organizing Framework p. 7.
159 Clement p. 65.
160 Ibid.
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latest concern has been “the failure of systematically significant institutions”161. clement 
notes that defining macroprudential through contrast with what he calls its “antonym” 
microprudential, the concept is clearer and closer to its origin.
We have previously referred to this as the “yin-yang” approach, and prefer this 
terminology since it does not pitch the two terms as antagonists but rather as comple-
mentary. For clement, achieving this balance is the main challenge and objective of 
the international community162. For example, the subject of the bis annual meeting in 
October of 2000 was “marrying the micro- and macro-prudential dimensions of finan-
cial stability”163. A more recent example is the approach taken by the bcbs through the 
package of fundamental reforms dubbed basel iii, based on the reasoning that “[c]learly 
these two micro and macroprudential approaches to supervision are interrelated, as 
greater resilience at the individual bank level reduces the risk of system wide shocks”164.
Following the yin-yang approach, clement finds macroprudential as referring to: 
“the use of prudential tools with the explicit objective of promoting the stability of the 
financial system as a whole, not necessarily of the individual institutions within it”165. si-
milarly, for the imf macroprudential policy aims at maintaining financial stability through 
the use of “prudential tools to limit systemic or system-wide financial risk”166. In this way, 
we can see macroprudential policy as the medicine that aims at keeping the financial 
system immune from systemic risk, to ultimately avoid harm to the macro-economy.
ii. The Virus of Systemic Risk
As macroprudential regulation strives for the stability of the system as a whole167, a 
“central element” in its definition is the notion of “systemic risk”168. In 2001 the wor-
king definition for the Group of ten (belguim, canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
netherlands, sweden, switzerland, United Kingdom, United states) was: “the risk that 
an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases 
in uncertainly about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough 
to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy”169. It also poin-
ted out that systemic risk events could be unexpected, as well as of growing likeliness 
due to inappropriate policy responses, and that the adverse real economic effects would 
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid., p. 65.
163 bis Monetary and Economic Department “bis Papers n.º 1: Marrying the macro- and microprudential 
dimensions of financial stability” (2001) bank for International settlements (QL). 
164 bcbs-Strengthening p. 2.
165 Clement p. 65.
166 imf-Organizing Framework p. 7. 
167 avinasH persaud, “Macro-Prudential regulation: Fixing Fundamental Market (and regulatory) Failures” 
(2009) World bank Group crisis response (note n.º 6), p. 2. 
168 imf-Organizing Framework p. 7.
169 Group of ten, “report on consolidation in the Financial sector” (2001) p. 126.
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generally be triggered by disruptions in the systems of payment and credit flows as well 
as through the decay of asset values170.
the G10 points at two underlying assumptions in its definition: a) “economic shocks 
may become systemic because of the existence of negative externalities associated with 
severe disruptions in the financial system”, and b) “systemic financial events must be 
very likely to induce undesirable real effects, such as substantial reductions in output 
and employment, in the absence of appropriate policy responses”171.
based on this definition, the European Parliament Policy Department draws three 
characteristics of systemic risk: a) it is a risk to the financial system as a whole, b) it 
“involves spillovers of risk from one institution to many others”, and c) materialization 
of systemic risk is usually linked to “adverse macro economy effects in the absence of 
rapid and strong policy responses”172.
the G10 formulation of systemic risk lived through the crisis and in their 2009 report 
to the G20 the imf, bis, and fsb similarly define systemic risk as “a risk of disruption to 
financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system 
and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy”173. 
Keeping up with the metaphor, systemic risk would be the virus that after infecting and 
disrupting one, or a few financial institutions, spreads throughout the system and results 
in significantly deteriorated macroeconomic health.
Hals scott breaks down the concept into what he calls the “three cs of systemic risk” 
which refer to three problems: correlation, connectedness, and contagion174. these are 
the ways through which shocks, or negative externalities, spread through the financial 
system and ultimately into the real economy175. there is a problem of correlation when 
several financial institutions are stakeholders to the same risk and will be simultaneously 
impacted if such risk materializes. they are exposed to the same negative events by having 
investments in the same sector, for example the us housing market prior to 2007[176]. there 
is a problem of connectedness when the failure of one institution causes the collapse of its 
contractual counterparties as would be the case of a “chain reaction of bank failures”177. 
Essentially when one goes down and others follow due to legal and economic ties.
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 stepHan gerLacH, “Defining and Measuring systemic risk” (23 november 2009) European Policy Dep. 
(QL) p. 3.
173 International Monetary Fund, bank for International settlements & Financial stability Forum, “Guidance 
to Assess the systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial conside-
rations” (20 October 2009) report to the G-20, pp. 5-6. 
174 HaL s. scott “How to Improve Five Important Areas of Financial regulation” in Rules for Growth: Pro-
moting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform (Yale Law and Economics research Paper n.º 426, 2011) 
113, p. 114 [scott]. 
175 Miguel Dijkman, “A Framework for Assessing systemic risk” (2010) the World bank (Policy research 
Working Paper n.º 5283) (QL) p. 6 [Dijkman].
176 Scott & Gelpern p. 21. 
177 Scott p. 114; Scott & Gelpern p. 22.
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the problem of contagion178 is a “broader and more elusive”179. It consists of be-
havioral changes by economic agents when responding to a particular event180. the 
traditional example is a bank run where depositors scramble to retrieve their deposits 
because they assume their bank will fail181. contagion can be rational, a reaction to real 
deficiencies, and also irrational when insufficient or wrong information herds a flight to 
safety or liquidity182.
iii. Exemplifying a useful macroprudential standard
Given that a determined focus on macroprudential policy is recent, the approaches, 
principles and standards are still debated183. However the fsb’s Compendium does contain 
guidelines in certain areas, for example the Guidance on Identification of Critical Functions and 
Critical Shared Services184. these guidelines seek to provide evaluation criteria to assist 
in determining what functions and services provided by a bank are critical for the real 
economy, meaning that their discontinuity could result in the systematically adverse 
consequences discussed above.
Instead of taking a state’s word that a measure was taken to safeguard a critical 
function and ensure the stability of the financial system, an expert panel could make 
use of the steps that the fsb guidelines put forth. these involve a much more serious 
and thorough analysis to determine whether the measure does in fact meet a reasonable 
means to ends approach. step one would be to “assess the impact of failure” where the 
fsb puts forth a copious amount of factors to take into consideration such as: the nature 
and extent of this activity (global, domestic, concerning payments, etc.), the nature of 
the customers and stakeholders (corporate, retail, involving housing, etc.), how fast the 
impact of the disruption will be, will consumers have time to react, interdependencies 
between markets, whether the products are tied to others, to name a few185. step two 
would be to “evaluate the market for the function”, taking into account: if the market can 
quickly substitute the service provider, if there is a high level of market concentration, 
178 some refer to correlation and connectedness as contagion through the real channel, see Dijkman p. 6; 
matt pritzker, “the channels for Financial contagion” (2000) the World bank, p. 3 (QL); scott re-
serves the name only for contagion through the information/social channel. 
179 Scott & Gelpern p. 23.
180 Dijkman, p. 6.
181 dougLas diamond & pHiLLip dybvig, “bank runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity” (1983) 91(3) Jrnl. 
of Pol. Econ. 401, p. 401.
182 Scott & Gelpern p. 23; see also Lieven baele et al. “Flights to safety” (2013) national bureau of Economic 
research (Working Paper n.º 19095).
183 For example: bogdan gLavan & fLava angHeL, “We are not Macroprudentialists: A skeptical view of 
Prudential regulation to Deal with systemic Externalities” (2013) 17(3) the Independent rev. 349.
184 Financial stability board, “recovery and resolution Planning for systematically Important Financial 
Institutions: Guidance on Identification of critical Functions and critical shared services” (16 July 
2013) (QL) [fsb-Guidance on Id. Critical Functions & Services]. 
185 fsb-Guidance on Id. Critical Functions & Services pp. 8-9.
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the percentage of market share, how do the institutions compete, would other providers 
want to assume the activities, and the list goes on and on186. step three would carry out 
the analysis on a firm by firm basis187.
As we can see, the determination of whether a measure is genuinely taken for a pru-
dential reason can be severely technical, a drastic change from simply accepting a Wto 
Member’s statement. It is an analysis that would surpass the capabilities of a “well quali-
fied” Wto panel. Yet it is not an analysis that would be out of reach to the expert panel 
that the afs requires. Part of the knowledge an expert panel could employ are micro- and 
macroprudential policy concepts given that these disciplines are in their very definition 
linked to the legitimate objectives the prudential cave-out lists as “prudential reasons”.
vIII. cOncLUsIOn: tHE PrUDEntIAL cArvE-OUt cAn bE DEMYstIFIED  
bY tHE ExPErt PAnEL tHE afs DEMAnDs
the objective undertaken in this work was to limit the ambiguity of the prudential 
carve-out provision to the greatest extent, in a way that respects dsu Article 3.2. this 
means that the interpretation cannot add to, or diminish, the content of the prudential 
carve-out, and the rights and obligations of Wto Members. through the analysis that 
an ordinary Panel would take, following the customary rules of treaty interpretation, 
the ambiguity that surrounds the prudential carve-out can be limited to some extent:
• The prudential reasons that inspire the taking of measures covered by the carve-
out are considered important enough to merit creating a safeguard clause specifically 
for financial services, unlike any other in the Wto context. this is linked to the fact 
that for many Members the prudential carve out was the most important provision in 
the Agreement.
• The prudential reasons enable the measures covered by the carve-out to ignore or 
not comply with acquired commitments despite all other provisions in the treaty, having 
the Members rejected limiting its scope to specific commitments like national treatment.
• The prudential reasons are not listed exhaustively and include the protection of 
certain financial consumers (it sets the traditional approach to list consumers that are 
creditors to funds), and the integrity and stability of the financial system as a whole. 
this is due to the fact that members could agree on examples of legitimate objectives 
that motivate the “prudential reasons”, but avoided discussing examples of prudential 
measures themselves.
• The prudential carve-out is does not contain elements that configure the chapeau 
of other Wto exceptions like the terms “necessary” and “not more burdensome than 
necessary”.
186 Ibid., pp. 9-11.
187 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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• The final sentence of the prudential carve-out was incorporated to prevent a loo-
phole. the concept of abus de droit is present in this final sentence meaning measures un-
dertaken cannot be used to avoid gats commitments, and must remain genuinely linked 
to the prudential reasons through a reasonable means to ends connection, even though 
the term “reasonable” was left out due the difficulty of defining it.
• The concept of “prudential” is linked to an idea of thinking/acting ahead to avoid 
certain harmful circumstances.
• The prudential carve-out provision reflects two gats objectives/principles, pro-
gressive liberalization and the right to regulate, and the desire to find balance between 
them. Most Members sought to balance these two objectives.
• The prudential carve-out is not the only peculiar provision in the afs and must be 
interpreted in connection with Paragraph 4 which mandates that a panel deciding on 
prudential issues have the “necessary expertise”.
these conclusions that can be reached through the customary rules of treaty interpre-
tation still leave a degree of uncertainty as to the prudential carve-out’s scope of appli-
cation. However this interpretation reveals the key, on exactly how this scope is to be 
determined. the importance given to dispute settlement by the Wto Members as the 
means to safeguard the principle of progressive liberalization and prevent a loophole 
open to abuse is materialized in Paragraph 4 of the afs. this particular form of dispute 
settlement is the window that enables the demystification of the prudential carve-out. 
Without it, if prudential matters would be subjected to resolution by ordinary Panels, 
the greatest degree of clarity to be reached would be the previously stated conclusions.
However, being subjected to a qualified form of dispute settlement, the prudential 
carve-out demands “expertise”. the correct application of such expertise would not be 
inconsistent with dsu Article 3.2, and on the contrary, follows the will of Wto Mem-
bers. through the application of its knowledge, an expert panel deciding on a prudential 
issue has the necessary elements to determine the measure’s reasonable means to ends 
connection with the prudential reason, in short, to determine if it is genuine.
to exemplify what knowledge an expert panel could apply, we have touched on the 
concepts developed in both microprudential and macroprudential policy due to their 
tangible link with the legitimate objectives the prudential carve-out illustrates as pru-
dential reasons. the examples have centered on depositor protection and the banking 
sector. However, nothing prevents the same being done with other legitimate objectives 
(such as investors and securities market efficiency, since that would also call for expert 
knowledge). these disciplines provide well respected global standards in certain areas, 
which bring into perspective particular elements that measure must take into account 
to be effective when protecting financial services consumers of a particular nature, or 
the financial system as a whole.
through the analysis presented, the scope of application of the gats afs prudential 
carve-out can be clarified to an acceptable degree, relying on a Panel’s expert knowledge 
in accordance with the Wto Member’s mandate. this is done in a way that does not add 
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to, or diminish, the rights and obligations of Wto Members. the application of expert 
knowledge cannot be capricious, instead maintaining a strict relationship with the le-
gitimate objectives contained in the provision, which is tangible manifestation of the 
Wto Members’ will. such expert knowledge serves to determine if a particular measure 
maintains a reasonable means to ends connection with the prudential carve-out’s legi-
timate objectives. consequently, if a Wto Panel ever faces a controversy on prudential 
matters, the prudential carve-out can be demystified following this analysis.
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